Eye on the ball

Good.

Well, for now.

Despite simmering tensions in the West Philippine Sea that have been matched since the start of the year by a social media word war soon after new Chinese ambassador, Jing Quan, took over the embassy in Manila in December, there have at least been a few signs that a potential rapprochement is in the works.

On top of the resumption in Cebu near the end of January of an undersecretary-level Philippines-China talks — described only as “candid and in-depth” (diplomatic lingo for “blunt”) — after a year-long pause were a number of subtle public signals. Recent signals include:

• Mr. Jing has been meeting with Philippine Cabinet secretaries overseeing areas of bilateral ties that can move ahead despite maritime tensions, e.g., with Interior and Local Government Secretary Juanito Victor “Jonvic” C. Remulla and Information and Communications Technology Secretary Henry R. Aguda, as well as with local government officials like mayors Ma. Josefina “Joy” Belmonte-Alimurung of Quezon City, Francisco “Isko Moreno” M. Domagoso of Manila, and Sebastian “Baste” Z. Duterte of Davao City.

• First Lady Liza A. Marcos — clearly as a proxy for President Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr. — has graced at least three high-profile events involving China’s embassy, led by Mr. Jing;

• Mr. Marcos himself has met Mr. Jing on a few public occasions, the most recent being at the ceremony marking the second phase of the Chinatown Revitalization project, but has otherwise issued conciliatory remarks, e.g., publicly thanking Mr. Jing for looming direct flights between Cebu and Fujian that begin next month (adding to direct flights between Manila and Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou as well as between Cebu and Quanzhou, also in Fujian province);

•Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi himself — “wolf warrior” personified in the Chinese Communist Party’s politburo (who I was privileged to interview in Beijing way back in 1999 when he was just an assistant foreign minister) — sent a rare message of condolence to his Philippine counterpart, Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro, on Jan. 31 for lives lost in the sinking of passenger ferry MV Trisha Kerstin 3 off Basilan on Jan. 26;

• The Philippines in mid-January adopted a 14-day visa-free program for Chinese citizens;

• Both sides have refrained from taking any negative official action against each other’s senior officials, e.g., declaring Mr. Jing persona non grata or sanctioning Philippine senators deemed having offended Chinese embassy officials;

• Both have publicly agreed on the need for dialogue to defuse the situation;

• And said they are committed (the Philippines, as 2026 chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN) to finalizing a long-delayed code of conduct for the South China Sea within the year (though there is wide divergence on issues such as whether it should be binding, if it will dilute/erode the effects of the 2016 arbitral award at The Hague, etc.).

Significantly, the Philippine Coast Guard has lately been relatively silent on any incident of harassment in the West Philippine Sea (even as the Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia ships were observed practicing what seemed to be blocking maneuvers in the waters of Chinese-occupied Paracel Islands closest to Vietnam, which also claims those features¹).

GOOD COP-BAD COP
Clearly, efforts are under way to soothe long-strained ties.

In his Feb. 14 speech at the embassy’s Chinese New Year reception, Mr. Jing — who, like his predecessor Huang Xilian, has been meeting with Chinese-Filipino businessmen as well — said that Philippine-China relations should “stabilize as soon as possible and continue moving forward,” and that the current troubled “situation must change, and it must change quickly².

Specifically, he is keen on pushing bilateral relations in areas outside the security and maritime spheres in order to set in motion “positive momentum to drown out the noise…” Citing the crucial role of more people-to-people engagement, he noted that “[a]s people visit each other more, misunderstandings and biases naturally fade away.”

He has noticeably refrained from issuing aggressive/antagonistic remarks against Filipino critics of Beijing’s ways, especially in the West Philippine Sea (preferring, rather, to say: “Let’s sit and talk.”)

The hatchet man’s job, it seems, belongs to Chinese Embassy Spokesperson Ji Lingpeng, who has unfailingly matched each and every criticism — even from senators — with an almost point-for-point counterargument.

The emerging SOP of this duo at the embassy resembles a good cop-bad cop, push-and-pull, carrot-and-stick routine.

TALL ORDER
Still, methinks that changing the ordinary Filipino’s mind as regards China is going to be a tall order, what with more Pinoys — nearly eight out of 10 of late — found distrusting our northern neighbor³ and continued reports on snooping by suspected agents of the Middle Kingdom⁴ (as well as the retaliatory arrest of Filipinos in China for alleged espionage — what ever happened to those unfortunates, I wonder?)

The US snoops on us too, pro-Beijing (both those genuinely convinced and those paid) Pinoys argue. Right, but then US ships are not harassing our boats within our own exclusive economic zone (EEZ), nor are they the ones preventing our impoverished subsistence fishermen from accessing their traditional fishing grounds.

So, it will take much more than overtures so far being made by both sides to improve bilateral relations palpably.

For good measure, maritime law expert Jay L. Batongbacal, who heads the University of the Philippines Institute of Maritime Affairs and the Law of the Sea, said that Beijing can demonstrate sincerity in talks for a mutually acceptable solution by withdrawing Chinese ships from the West Philippine Sea⁵ (even, I would think, without outrightly conceding its claim for now) that sometimes venture as close as 20-50 nautical miles (NM) off Luzon’s western coast, though still carefully outside Philippine territorial waters within 12 NM from the shoreline.

Or, at the very least, do not harass our fishermen nor block our efforts to tap oil and gas at Reed Bank (since the much-vaunted new find at the Malampaya field, which now covers 20-25% of Philippine energy needs but is expected to run dry some time in 2027-2029, is estimated to extend our supply from that source by just a few years⁶).

CLEARER HIERARCHY OF INTERESTS NEEDED…
Which brings us to the question of how exactly we are to consolidate efforts and resources now that we are working to improve relations without compromising national interest.

A patriotic diplomat bared some thoughts on a West Philippine Sea (WPS) agenda in our foreign-national security policy group chat. Some of his points were:

• There has to be a national consensus on goals and direction, and these should be translated into a national strategy that transcends political administrations. This thrust includes strengthening relevant institutions, starting with the Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Defense departments, which “must be insulated from politics.”

• Such consensus should extend to the hierarchy of national interests and priorities (e.g., “Good bilateral relations is good, but at what cost?” Is protecting our sovereign rights in our EEZ of higher or lesser value?)

• This national strategy, in turn, should be translated “into a coherent, comprehensive, principled and purposeful foreign policy.” “To protest is important, but to protest without direction and no framework as to where do we want this to go, is a waste of national protest,” the diplomat said. “We don’t protest for the sake of protesting. It must be part of a larger framework.”

I disagreed with some points, including the diplomat’s view that “there is a need to rethink the policy that the SCS (South China Sea) is not the sum total of our relations with China” since it “sends a wrong message” when “China has always been all out on the SCS.” For me, there is no contradiction between acting resolutely (though in varied ways) in defending our rights in the WPS (which is just part of the SCS) and in pushing other avenues for bilateral cooperation.

But I agree wholeheartedly with our joint defense and coast guard patrols and training “with like-minded countries.” China has proven itself the bully in the WPS, and true to form of any bully, its ships keep a cautious distance whenever ours maneuver with those of allies in those waters. Perhaps, the frequency of such maneuvers can be a bargaining chip in talks with Beijing, but giving in to exclusively bilateral talks in handling our WPS spat plays into the designs of a bully.

We also need to move faster on acquisitions for a credible defense posture. This is why the reported defunding of defense (both military and coast guard) modernization efforts, and fund realignment to dubious uses, in the past two to three years was tantamount to treason in my book. Because, then, Beijing doesn’t need to do anything to keep us weak and defenseless if we shoot ourselves in the foot that way.

There is also the need to rally more Filipinos on the WPS issue. The government needs to find ways to make this an election issue for 2028 by explaining how it impacts households, e.g., in terms of fish and other marine food for the table, and sufficient, affordable electricity now that Malampaya is nearly depleted.

… AND ONE VOICE
One good outcome from this spat is that we are honing our skills in dealing with a superpower. I wish we were on the same level as the likes of Indonesia and Vietnam in this arena, but we are clearly still learning how to balance our foreign policy the way these ASEAN powers do — and the world’s two superpowers respect them for that ability.

But besides all the points we mentioned above is the need to speak with one voice even amid a diversity of views.

Let’s get one issue out of the way at this point: yes, uniformed government personnel are just as entitled as civilians to their respective opinions. But members of the armed services — whether the military, the police, or the coast guard — have less leeway in expressing these views in public, since their roles affect national security. And, like it or not, that uniform — as well as the official position one holds (whether in uniform or in civilian attire), especially if as a spokesman — represent the authority of the government wherever one goes. And even from a practical standpoint, it is unwise for these uniformed personnel to engage in ad hominem stunts of any kind, e.g., presenting caricatures of personalities in public lectures, since that cheapens and lessens the credibility of their arguments. This holds true for active-duty personnel, especially if they are spokespersons.

Then there is a need for more cohesion on the foreign policy front.

To be sure, turfs, rivalry and infighting hound most bureaucracies worldwide, but it is best to minimize them — and, in fact, work on cohesion — especially when faced with a major external threat that is adept at capitalizing on the slightest sign of disunity.

We have witnessed signs of such a turf war at home — from criticism by some officials in some group chats that our decision to notify China of our supply missions to BRP Sierra Madre was tantamount to seeking Beijing’s permission (and, in fact, Chinese officials frame that arrangement that way to their publics), to the warning by former Supreme Court associate justice Antonio T. Carpio that “closed-door diplomacy” espoused by the DFA on WPS matters could erode wide international support gained through the military’s and coast guard’s transparency initiative in immediately baring Chinese aggression in the Philippine EEZ⁷.

I just hope that the “casual commentators, non-practitioners, and self-styled experts” that the DFA spokesman for maritime affairs cited in his Feb. 13 press conference did not refer to experts in think tanks and the academe. In powers like the United States and China, and even among neighbors like Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, think tanks and the academe are considered part of the foreign policy community whose views are carefully considered.

One example: the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has established a structure for regularly tapping policy inputs from the private sector in the form of the AFP Multi-Sector Governance Council, composed of members of the academe, think tanks, civil society, and business who provide recommendations on governance, transparency, policy implementation and other concerns⁸.

I know that the DFA does seek private sector inputs from time to time, but perhaps pressing issues such as improving bilateral ties with China warrant a more formal consultative mechanism.

¹ https://tinyurl.com/23d7lk8r

² https://tinyurl.com/2bu8x9kl

^3�� https://tinyurl.com/24z6z2qp

⁴ https://tinyurl.com/289mp9ce

⁵ https://tinyurl.com/236nqagf

⁶ https://tinyurl.com/27xsz554

�� https://tinyurl.com/22w8wpvy

�� https://tinyurl.com/2djkkzw9

⁷ https://tinyurl.com/2yphkpgr

⁸ https://tinyurl.com/29cv2h8k

https://tinyurl.com/2am7amee

Wilfredo G. Reyes was editor-in-chief of ����ý from 2020 through 2023.