By Karishma Vaswani
THE Russia-India-China alliance, floated in the 1990s as a counterweight to the US, is being revived today as a way for the three countries to ride out the storm of President Donald Trump鈥檚 trade war. But old suspicions mean the union is unlikely to endure. Despite their shared grievances with Washington, the partnership is more a marriage of convenience.
That reality will be on display this week when the three nuclear powers converge in Tianjin for the summit. The Kremlin is pressing for a long-awaited . If the troika did , it would send a powerful signal that the geopolitical heavyweights are aligning in the face of US pressure. But the inherent tensions between India and China, and economic differences between the three, make that outcome unlikely.
That pressure is most acute for India. Until recently a key American partner, it has borne the brunt of Trump鈥檚 tariffs. He doubled duties on exports to 鈥 on Aug. 27 鈥 as punishment for its purchases of Russian oil.
Beijing, originally Washington鈥檚 primary target, is enjoying a , but is stuck in a long-term strategic competition. And Russia, battered by sanctions and bogged down in Ukraine, is on the hunt for friends to blunt its isolation.
Moscow first dreamed up the as it was dubbed, in the 1990s. Then- proposed the formation of the group to challenge the US鈥檚 global influence. The coalition looked formidable on paper 鈥 three nations with huge economies and populations. In practice, it鈥檚 always been undermined by mistrust, above all between rivals India and China.
Among the biggest sticking points is their long-running border dispute. They鈥檝e been at loggerheads over an ill-defined 3,488-kilometer frontier in the Himalayan region. Those hostilities , and continue to simmer today. In 2020, the two in Ladakh鈥檚 Galwan Valley, leaving soldiers dead on both sides in the bloodiest fighting in decades. Diplomatic ties froze, with New Delhi for Chinese nationals, and imposing restrictions on tech imports.
Trump鈥檚 tariffs are nudging them closer. Last week, they agreed to explore , a key move toward resolving the territorial dispute. Strains around visas have eased and China has with India on exports.
But the can鈥檛 be discounted. The fundamental contradictions in the dynamic are unlikely to disappear soon, , founder and director of the , notes for the . While serious violence may have been averted for now, a lasting rapprochement is unlikely. It鈥檚 hard for New Delhi to be fully confident of Beijing鈥檚 intentions, especially in light of its military assertiveness in areas like the South China Sea and Taiwan.
China is also far too close to Pakistan for India鈥檚 comfort. Beijing has become Islamabad鈥檚 most since the end of the Cold War. During a clash with India in May, Pakistan claimed Chinese-made J-10C jets were used to five Indian fighter jets during the conflict. New Delhi said the PRC also provided its rival with . This alignment deepens India鈥檚 security anxieties and reinforces the sense that China can鈥檛 be trusted.
Setting security aside, the economic logic doesn鈥檛 work in New Delhi鈥檚 favor. India depends on US technology, capital, and supply chains 鈥 which neither Russia nor China can replace. America is also the most important market for Indian goods, by a wide margin. In 2024, consumers worth of Indian goods, according to a Bank of Baroda report. In comparison, Chinese and were only a fraction of that.
In contrast, Moscow is much closer to Beijing. Since Western sanctions were imposed in 2014 after Russia鈥檚 annexation of Crimea, bilateral trade between the two has surged to record highs, last year. Businesses are to the Chinese financial system through the use of the yuan, and services like UnionPay cards. For New Delhi, joining such a bloc would mean being the junior partner 鈥 hardly an appealing prospect.
That hasn鈥檛 stopped Moscow from trying to rejuvenate it. In May, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said 鈥溾 of the troika. Beijing has also backed the initiative, saying it could uphold in the world.
Resurrecting the bloc could pose a if it resulted in more coordinated action. But what binds these nations is necessity, not trust. The gathering in Tianjin will offer the opportunity for the optics of warmer ties, but it will be more symbolism than substance. This is an inherently fragile partnership, one that could unravel if American pressure diminishes.
BLOOMBERG OPINION
