The first risk is institutional and reputational.

The sequence of events has now entered public consciousness. A senator facing an International Criminal Court-related warrant was effectively sheltered within Senate premises under 鈥減rotective custody,鈥� allowed to participate in a dramatic leadership change, and later escorted out of the building despite active efforts by authorities to serve him the warrant. The Senate initially projected the narrative that it was under external threat. Subsequent reports, however, showed otherwise. The alleged 鈥渁ttack鈥� appeared exaggerated, if not entirely imagined. Philippine National Police (PNP) and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) official reports indicated that the gunfire came from Senate security personnel themselves and involved only a lone National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent who had remained behind upon the request of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) authorities to help secure their premises.

The Supreme Court鈥檚 subsequent denial of the senator鈥檚 petition for a Temporary Restraining Order further weakened the legal and moral basis for the Senate鈥檚 actions. The implication became difficult to avoid: the institution appeared less interested in defending constitutional independence than in shielding one of its own.

SELF-INFLICTED DAMAGE
This is where the Senate inflicted damage upon itself.

For decades, the Senate cultivated the image of being the country鈥檚 stabilizing institution, the chamber where statesmanship prevailed over political impulse, where independent judgment tempered executive excess, and where constitutional principles carried greater weight than partisan loyalty. That image has now been severely compromised.

The problem did not begin this week or last week. The Senate had already suffered reputational damage last year when it refused to immediately proceed with the impeachment process against the Vice-President and instead remanded the matter back to the House of Representatives on procedural grounds. To many, that decision suggested a reluctance to confront politically difficult issues directly despite the Constitution鈥檚 use of the word 鈥渇orthwith.鈥�

To its credit, the Senate this year finally organized itself into an impeachment court. But the institutional damage had already accumulated. The events of the past week only reinforced public suspicion that accountability in the country has become selective and negotiable.

That is the essence of the Senate鈥檚 idiosyncratic risk.

It is a risk unique to the institution itself: the erosion of its credibility, legitimacy, and moral authority. The Senate now faces a growing perception that it no longer functions as an independent constitutional body guided principally by law and national interest, but increasingly as a political sanctuary shaped by alliances, personalities, and survival instincts.

The decline is not merely procedural; it is cultural and institutional.

The Senate today is increasingly perceived as dominated by celebrity politics, media performance, and political theatrics rather than serious legislation and statesmanship. Public debate has become noisier but less substantive. Committee assignments often appear driven more by political convenience than expertise. Institutional independence, once the Senate鈥檚 defining characteristic, now appears inconsistent and selective depending on the issue involved.

This deterioration matters because institutions derive their authority not only from constitutional design but from public trust. Once that trust weakens, institutional legitimacy begins to erode.

SYSTEMIC RISK, MORE SERIOUS
But the second risk is even more serious.

The Senate鈥檚 credibility crisis is no longer confined to itself. It now threatens to generate systemic or economywide consequences, particularly at a time when the Philippine economy is already showing increasing signs of stagflation.

This concern is not speculative. No less than President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. himself has publicly expressed concern over the possible emergence of stagflationary conditions in the country. That concern is not without basis.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMY LOSING STEAM
The Philippine economy has clearly been losing momentum. Annual GDP growth slowed from 5.7% in 2024 to 4.4% in 2025. Quarterly growth data have shown a continuing downtrend, culminating in a disappointing 2.8% in real GDP growth in the first quarter of 2026.

The weakness is broad-based.

Agriculture remains under pressure, with palay production continuing to decline amid structural inefficiencies, climate disruptions, and supply constraints. Industry has weakened significantly, from 5.6% growth in 2024 to only 1.7% in 2025, before contracting by 0.1% in the first quarter of 2026. Manufacturing barely expanded during the same period, while construction sharply decelerated to 2.8% from 7.1% the previous year. Even the services sector, traditionally the economy鈥檚 growth anchor, has shown visible moderation.

ELEVATED INFLATION
At the same time, inflationary pressures remain elevated.

Consumer prices continue to erode household purchasing power, particularly among lower-income Filipinos already burdened by food and transport costs. More concerning are the inflation forecasts themselves. Following the elevated April inflation print of 7.2%, well above the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas鈥� target range, inflation is now projected to average 6.3% in 2026 and 4.3% in 2027, both significantly above target.

The upside risks are equally troubling: geopolitical tensions involving Iran, Israel, and the United States; uncertainties surrounding the Strait of Hormuz; the threat of El Ni帽o to domestic food supply; second-round effects on transport fares and wages; and the sustained weakening of the peso.

This is the dangerous combination that is characteristic of stagflation: slowing growth accompanied by persistently high inflation.

ACCELERATING ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES
The Senate鈥檚 recent actions did not create these economic vulnerabilities. But they may have accelerated them by injecting another thick layer of uncertainty into an already fragile environment.

Political institutions are not isolated from economic outcomes. Weak institutions create uncertainty; uncertainty weakens confidence; and weakened confidence discourages investment and economic activity.

The timing therefore could not be worse.

The country鈥檚 fiscal space is already narrowing rapidly. National Government debt has exceeded 65% of GDP, while weak revenue generation continues to constrain the government鈥檚 capacity to sustain aggressive infrastructure and development spending. The ongoing controversies surrounding flood control projects and public spending have also created a chilling effect within the bureaucracy, slowing implementation, and weakening capital formation.

Meanwhile, the Philippine economy remains heavily dependent on overseas remittances and business process outsourcing or BPO revenues, both of which are vulnerable to global instability. The recent Middle East conflict therefore presents not merely a geopolitical concern but a direct economic threat to remittance flows, labor markets, and energy prices.

The country鈥檚 energy vulnerability remains especially alarming. The Philippines remains heavily dependent on imported fossil fuel, exposing the economy to external price shocks and supply disruptions. Red alerts in the Luzon and Visayas power grids have already underscored the fragility of domestic energy supply and transmission systems.

CONFUSION AND FRAGILITY
Under such conditions, what the country requires most are stable, disciplined, and credible institutions capable of reassuring markets and encouraging long-term investment.

Instead, the Senate projected confusion, volatility, and institutional fragility.

The implications are not theoretical. Financial markets respond quickly to political instability. Investor confidence weakens. Currency pressures intensify. Risk premiums rise. Businesses postpone expansion decisions. Foreign investors become more cautious toward economies where institutions themselves appear unstable or politicized.

Indeed, even international media coverage reflected those concerns. Foreign reporting described the Philippines as entering another period of political turmoil and institutional instability. What should have demonstrated democratic maturity instead projected political spectacle and constitutional uncertainty.

FROM IDIOSYNCRATIC TO SYSTEMIC RISK
This is how idiosyncratic risk transforms into systemic risk.

The Senate may initially have believed that the controversy involved only an internal political maneuver, a leadership dispute, the protection of an ally, or an institutional turf issue. But institutions do not operate in isolation. Their actions shape perceptions regarding governance quality, rule of law, accountability, and policy stability across the entire political system.

And in an economy already facing slowing growth and elevated inflation, the additional burden of institutional instability may hasten the emergence of stagflationary conditions.

The tragedy is that the Senate once represented the opposite. It was historically regarded as the country鈥檚 last major institutional guardrail, a chamber capable of moderating political excesses, defending constitutional boundaries, and producing leaders with intellectual depth and independence.

Today, that reputation is badly diminished.

Ultimately, the gravest damage inflicted last week was not on any political faction or branch of government. It was on the credibility and legitimacy of the Philippine Senate itself. And in weakening one of the country鈥檚 most important democratic institutions, the Senate may also have deepened the economywide risks confronting the Philippines at a particularly vulnerable moment in its history.

To be sure, what the Philippine Senate is doing is hardly revolutionary. Yet like Saturn of old, it risks consuming the very forces it once nurtured.

Diwa C. Guinigundo is the former deputy governor for the Monetary and Economics Sector, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). He served the BSP for 41 years. In 2001-2003, he was alternate executive director at the International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC. He is the senior pastor of the Fullness of Christ International Ministries in Mandaluyong.

On the electrical power system, as of this writing, we continue to monitor the issuances of red and yellow alerts over Luzon and the Visayas by the National Grid Corp. of the Philippines (NGCP) signaling sufficiency or insufficiency of supply and reserves to meet system demand. This follows the tripping of critical transmission lines in south Luzon resulting in a loss of around 2,500 megawatts (MW) of capacity which then triggered widespread power interruptions on the main island. In a statement released on May 15, the Department of Energy (DoE) said that it has mobilized the Grid Reliability Task Force to conduct a full investigation of the incident and required the NGCP to provide full disclosure of operational data, incident reports, and technical findings for a comprehensive assessment of the event.

Quite fortuitously, earlier this week, it was also reported that the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) partially granted a motion for reconsideration by the NGCP for an upward adjustment of the regulated entity鈥檚 revenue cap for the 5^th regulatory period covering 2023-2027. According to the Order, promulgated on May 15, the Commission modified its earlier Final Determination, dated Jan. 9, and adjusted the NGCP鈥檚 Maximum Allowable Revenue (MAR) for the said period from P374.981 billion to P378.711 billion, or an Annual Revenue Requirement (ARR) ranging from P63.659 billion for 2023 to P89.982 billion for 2027. This will later be translated to transmission rates on peso/kW or peso/kWh basis to be collected from consumers starting in the October 2026 billing.

It is against this backdrop that we discuss the highlights of the Discussion Paper prepared by Dr. Adoracion Navarro of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), entitled, 鈥淭he Need for Power Transmission Sector Reforms in the Philippines.鈥�

The study was part of the January 2026 publication by PIDS (the full copy is available on its website) and presented in a webinar on May 14 鈥� yes, fortuitously scheduled as well 鈥� for which I was invited to provide some reaction and inputs. The copy of the presentation is available at .

KEY FUNDAMENTALS
We often hear the phrase 鈥渢here is no transition without transmission,鈥� and assume this to mean that the grid just needs to continue expanding to meet the requirements of the energy transition. This is why I found it refreshing that Dr. Navarro took the time to discuss the history of the Philippine power sector in her study. It frames quite astutely the fact that, to a great extent, what we still have is a grid that existed prior to the reforms introduced by the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001.

While it is true that there have been expansions to the network, including the most important Mindanao-Visayas Interconnection Project, the grid remains a highly centralized network designed to operate with large power generation units, including the large renewable energy (RE) plants built and operated pre-EPIRA by the National Power Corp. and its independent power producers (IPPs). The question then that must be asked and perhaps addressed in a joint technical-economic study: given the direction the DoE has taken on increasing supply from RE and indigenous resources to wean us away from dependence on imported fuels, what revisions are needed in: a.) the grid鈥檚 design to most efficiently serve variably-sized RE plants located in multiple far-flung sites, and b.) the operation of a power system with high-and-dispersed RE penetration?

Dr. Navarro鈥檚 paper is also most helpful in dedicating a chapter discussing the economic principles governing the transmission industry. Given the tendency for political discussions to veer towards forcing competition in the transmission and distribution sectors via the issuance of parallel franchises over the same area, Dr. Navarro鈥檚 study serves as a good reminder as to why the transmission of electricity is known as a natural monopoly: it is one 鈥渃haracterized by high fixed costs, economies of scale, and network externalities. In liberalized electricity markets, transmission plays a critical coordinating role by enabling competition in generation and supply while remaining subject to economic regulation鈥� Transmision investments are typically large, lumpy and irreversible鈥︹��

As a natural monopoly, the success then of the transmission sector in the grand scheme of a power system rests in several factors beyond competition.

PERSISTENT ISSUES
Dr. Navarro identified seven issues that continue to beset the sector in the Philippines: project delays; regulatory concerns; right-of-way concerns; grid reliability (including reserves and ancillary services); coordination and institutional frictions; ownership and national security concerns; and transmission capacity and congestion. I agree with the assessment of these issues and would just highlight the following points on three matters:

1. On project delays and transmission congestion. Dr. Navarro noted that although the ERC had imposed penalties on NGCP for certain project delays, 鈥渃ritics argue that the economic costs of delayed investments 鈥� such as congestion, reliability issues, and foregone access to cheaper generation 鈥� are substantial and often underestimated.鈥�

Indeed, penalties cannot approximate the economic costs of delays in transmission projects. In the ERC鈥檚 evaluation of the NGCP鈥檚 application for approval of transmission projects, the economic analysis actually includes an estimate of the expected amount of energy not being served (EENS) to consumers, in the absence of the project, resulting from capacity shortages or unexpected power outages for the period considered, which is usually 15 years given the planning horizon for transmission assets. For example, in the ERC鈥檚 Order approving the Balaoan-Laoag 500-kilovolt (kV) Transmission Project (ERC Case No. 2021-003RC, promulgated on Nov. 26, 2024), the Commission computed the EENS for 15 years at 13,079,227,930 kilowatt/hour (kWh). Translating this in monetary terms using P18.75/kWh as the Cost of Alternative Energy Sources (CAES) 鈥� usually benchmarked to the cost of diesel fuel in the area to be served by the project at the time of evaluation 鈥� the ERC estimated P99.813 billion to be the cost to consumers over the 15 year period resulting from the absence of this one project alone. The potential revenue loss to generators, on the other hand, was estimated at P50.320 billion for the same period. Given the magnitude of these amounts and the maximum penalty of P50 million for each violation that ERC may impose, it is reasonable to expect the penalties will always fall short of the actual cost of delay.

The impact gets more magnified when delays affect interconnector projects and or result in line congestion.

Dr. Navarro correctly points out that 鈥淸w]hen transmission capacity is not available on time, lower-cost or cleaner generation gets curtailed, forcing the system to rely on more expensive alternatives. Congestion is especially acute in fast-growing load centers (such as cities in the Visayas), where demand growth has outpaced transmission upgrades. These constraints not only increase system costs but also undermine broader policy objectives related to system security and decarbonization.鈥�

One can simply monitor the average prices at the wholesale electricity spot market (WESM) daily to verify the disparity in prices in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao that can largely be attributed to congestion: to illustrate, for May 19, the Load Weighted Average Price (LWAP) for the system was P7.32/kWh. For Luzon, however, the LWAP was P3.90/kWh, while it stood at P20.21/kWh for the Visayas and P11.05/kWh for Mindanao.

2. On regulatory concerns. Dr. Navarro also explains the rationale behind the shift from the return-on-rate-base (RORB) methodology to the performance-based review (PBR) regime that currently governs the transmission and distribution sectors pursuant to EPIRA. The economic theory behind the adoption of PBR is to link the revenues of the regulated entity to outcomes to reduce the need for heavy-handed regulation. However, she observes, 鈥溾�or reasons still insufficiently addressed in public discourse, the ERC was unable to conduct on time the regulatory reset for 2016 to 2020 (the Fourth Regulatory Period or 4th RP). This delay is inappropriate because PBR is designed to be forward-looking, relying on forecasts to establish rates before the start of each regulatory period. As a result, transmission rates for the 4^th RP were not determined as scheduled and the NGCP was allowed to operate using the wheeling charges set during the 3^rd 搁笔鈥︹赌�

While the laudable intention behind the shift from RORB methodology to PBR cannot be disputed, we must also confront our scorecard for success, so to speak, in implementing a regulatory regime observed in many developed countries with stronger governance and enforcement institutions. Our experience with PBR or incentives-based methodology in the power sector, for instance, has been ad hoc and improvisational, at best.

I find merit in Dr. Navarro鈥檚 proposal to adopt what she calls a 鈥渉ybrid approach鈥� that offers a more balanced policy option. This, to my mind, allows us to still benefit from the decades of experience and jurisprudence on the RORB methodology while also developing the discipline needed among regulators and stakeholders alike for an effective incentives-based regime. For this hybrid approach, particularly for capital expenditures, Dr. Navarro suggests one 鈥渨here capital expenditures are provisionally included to support financing but only fully recognized for depreciation and return upon commissioning… International experience in liberalized markets suggests that such hybrid designs can better align investment incentives with consumer protection (e.g., 鈥榮plit CAPEX鈥� method in the UK)鈥︹�� This, of course, does not do away with ensuring that the Commission is well-capacitated to perform its job not only to make timely approvals but, perhaps more importantly, in following through on monitoring and regular validation of project completion and rate adjustments, particularly in case of unjustified project delays.

3. On coordination among institutions and grid reliability. The DoE鈥檚 push for large capacity-RE projects through the Green Energy Auction Program (GEAP) and its recent policy on energy storage solutions make coordination and alignment among the ERC, the DoE and the NGCP more crucial than ever. As clearly articulated in Dr. Navarro鈥檚 study:

鈥淚n theory, flexibility options such as energy storage, demand response, and increased interconnection can interact with transmission investment decisions. These options may reduce the need for certain transmission projects, but they also alter the risk-return profile of network investments. Well-designed market and regulatory institutions therefore are essential to ensure that transmission expansion keeps pace with system needs without imposing excessive costs on consumers.

鈥淚n the Philippine context, these theoretical concerns are evident. Transmission expansion is planned through long-term Transmission Development Plans [TDP]. But implementation faces uncertainty arising from fluctuating demand projections, delays in generation projects, rights-of-way issues, and evolving energy policies. These risks shape the incentives of the NGCP鈥nd influence the timing and scale of investments.鈥�

Alignment of generation and transmission projects was the focus of the modeling done for the study initiated in 2018 by the DoE, with the support of the US National Renewable Energy Laboratories (NREL), and completed in 2020 identifying what are now known as the Competitive RE Zones (CREZ) all over the country. The CREZ report already highlighted what it called the 鈥渢imescale misalignment鈥�: while it takes around two to three years only to construct a wind or solar project, it would typically take around 10-20 years to build a transmission project if factors such as ROW acquisition and regulatory delays are not addressed.

We also have today what we can call 鈥減roject siting misalignment鈥�: while the NGCP reports that there is currently 10 gigawatts of capacity available in the grid for generator connections, the location of these connection points may not be in the areas where RE projects awarded under the GEAP would connect, unless the TDP is aligned with the CREZ report, and the CREZ report is aligned with the GEAP design.

When project siting misalignment persists and close coordination is lacking in long-term planning between transmission and generation, we cannot have a grid that is optimally designed for cost-effective service delivery and reliability.

INCREASED COMPLEXITY
The recent grid incident in Luzon and the series of red and yellow alerts are just the latest of what we may consider as distress signals from the system itself to adopt certain reforms. As the generation profile is reconfigured with significant RE capacity, we must ensure that this actually results in improved energy security by reducing dependence on imported fuel and increasing system reliability. This means the transmission infrastructure and system operation will need to be adjusted accordingly.

This will not be easy, nor will it come without deliberate design. 鈥淭he evolution of ancillary services procurement and reserve markets highlights the importance of institutional adaptability, but it also underscores the need to carefully manage cost pass-through to consumers,鈥� Dr. Navarro observes. 鈥淎s grid complexity increases, regulatory frameworks must ensure reliability while maintaining transparency and accountability in cost recovery.鈥�

Monalisa C. Dimalanta is a senior partner at Puyat Jacinto & Santos Law (PJS Law). She was the chairperson and CEO of the Energy Regulatory Commission from 2022 to 2025, and chairperson of the National Renewable Energy Board from 2019 to 2021.

Newman: Okay. You cited freedom of speech in that. Why should your right to freedom of speech trump a trans person鈥檚 right not to be offended?

Peterson: Because in order to be able to think, you have to risk being offensive. I mean, look at the conversation we鈥檙e having right now. You鈥檙e certainly willing to risk offending me in the pursuit of truth. Why should you have the right to do that? It鈥檚 been rather uncomfortable.

Newman: Well, I鈥檓 very glad I put you on this part鈥�

Peterson: You get my point. You鈥檙e doing what you should do, which is digging a bit to see what the hell is going on. And that is what you should do. But you鈥檙e exercising your freedom of speech to certainly risk offending me, and that鈥檚 fine. More power to you, as far as I鈥檓 concerned.

Newman: So you haven鈥檛 sat there and鈥� I鈥檓 just鈥� I鈥檓 just trying to work that out鈥� I mean鈥� [long pause]

Peterson: Ha! Gotcha!

Newman: You have caught me. You have caught me.

There would be other interviews, of course: the GQ one with Helen Lewis (2019), the various Joe Rogan podcasts, and his supremely elegant team-up with Douglas Murray. However, Jordan Peterson first really came into public consciousness in 2016 when he famously objected to Canadian legislation (Bill C-16) regarding gender identity and expression, arguing it compelled speech and threatened free expression. This was at the height of 鈥渨okeness,鈥� and the Canadian Bill ridiculously wanted to force citizens to use preferred gender pronouns (such as 鈥渢hey,鈥� 鈥渮e,鈥� 鈥渮ir鈥�).

Ultimately, perhaps it was not coincidental that the moment met the man and Peterson certainly played a huge role in bring wokeness to heel.

This unknown Canadian psychologist from Edmonton, Alberta burst into the scene and basically laid the foundations for the destruction of woke, LGBQ++, trans, and feminist ideologies.

Consider the landscape into which he entered. Ben Shapiro was still recovering from a bruising and widely publicized interview with Andrew Neil. Charlie Kirk was in the early stages of building Turning Point USA. Eminent intellectuals such as Thomas Sowell, Roger Scruton, and Charles Murray couldn鈥檛 break out from the halls of academia and into the popular realm. Figures like Matt Walsh, Michael Knowles, and Douglas Murray had yet to fully establish themselves. The broader right, particularly in the West, was fragmented, reactive, and intellectually on the defensive.

Then comes Peterson, without a political machine nor with media training nor even with the instinctive polish of a seasoned public figure. He came instead armed with something far more potent: clarity of thought. And at a time when clarity had all but vanished from public discourse, that alone was revolutionary.

What made his impact so decisive was not merely that he opposed wokeism but that he changed the terms of engagement entirely. Before Peterson, conservatives often argued from instinct, tradition, religion, or frustration. Progressives, by contrast, dominated the terrain of intellectualism, framing themselves as morally superior while casting dissent as ignorance or malice. In such a paradigm, debate was not merely difficult, it was practically unwinnable.

Jordan Peterson changed all that.

Drawing from psychology, philosophy, and political history, he reintroduced rigor into conservative thought. He spoke not in slogans but in frameworks and analysis. In doing so, he gave conservatives something they had long lacked: a language popularly accessible, capable of confronting ideology at the most methodical level.

Peterson, simply, was 鈥渢he most significant conservative thinker to appear in the English-speaking world in a generation鈥� 鈥� so says Yoram Hazony.

Yet there is a cost to such a role. As Ben Shapiro himself has observed, those who choose to fight for what they believe to be true, particularly when grounded in moral or even religious conviction, often pay a price. It is not a question of if but when.

Today, Peterson faces profound personal challenges, including severe health complications that have been described in stark terms. Whether he returns fully to public life remains uncertain. And that uncertainty lends his story a certain gravity.

But perhaps that is beside the point.

Movements are not sustained by individuals alone but by the ideas they leave behind. And in that respect, Peterson鈥檚 legacy is already secure. He reminded a generation that ideas matter, that language shapes reality, and that moral courage requires more than good intentions 鈥� it requires strength.

For a brief but critical moment, when conservatism stood at its lowest ebb, he did more than speak. He taught. And in teaching, he changed everything.

Jemy Gatdula is the dean of the UA&P Law School and is a Philippine Judicial Academy lecturer for constitutional philosophy and jurisprudence. The views expressed here are his own and not necessarily of the institutions to which he belongs.

Twitter @jemygatdula

My topic for today鈥檚 column 鈥� how to invest during a crisis if you鈥檙e an entrepreneur 鈥� is particularly useful for two reasons. The first is it will give investors a clearer idea of what to do in these tumultuous times. The second is that if you鈥檙e an entrepreneur, investment 鈥� whether by your company or from your personal finances 鈥� can be an important source of capital or a way to weather the storm if your business is negatively affected by the crisis. But ironically, many successful entrepreneurs who are great at business don鈥檛 know where to start when it comes to investing.

Enter Julian Tarrobago. He is an investment mentor and consultant who has managed funds worth billions for institutions like Union Bank, Atram, ING, and Sun Life. Today, he has a company called JT Train Consulting where he helps investors and entrepreneurs learn how to think, decide, and stay disciplined when everything becomes uncertain. In his own words, he teaches them everything from 鈥渒nowing their investor profile to asset allocation, to doing the research, to doing risk management and portfolio management and using AI to turbocharge those frameworks.鈥�

I was lucky enough to speak to Mr. Tarrobago in the RJ Ledesma Podcast where he imparted eye-opening information about what investors should do in times like these. Read on to learn some of the highlights of our conversation.

THE SKY IS FALLING. DON鈥橳 REACT.
When markets fall and the future is uncertain, many investors immediately choose to sell. Mr. Tarrobago warns against such panic-selling behavior. In fact, he cautions against any emotional response. Instead, he advises investors to rely on frameworks.

鈥淲hen the sky is falling or when there is a major fundamental event or market crash, for example 鈥� like right now, there鈥檚 a lot of uncertainty out there 鈥� [fund managers] don鈥檛 get emotional, but they act using frameworks. The frameworks tell them exactly what to do when market conditions deteriorate, and they also see when market conditions 鈥� that鈥檚 market and macro conditions 鈥� are improving.

鈥淧rofessional fund managers don鈥檛 try to predict what happens. They position and they prepare for different conditions.鈥�

This systematic approach runs counter to many entrepreneurs鈥� quick, decisive, and aggressive business instincts, and we鈥檒l discuss more about systems later鈥�

FORGED IN FIRE: A HISTORY OF CRISES
Mr. Tarrobago is no stranger to financial crises. Inspired and informed by the movie Wall Street, he began his career as an equity analyst in 1995, and since then he has been through the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, and the global pandemic in 2020.

Recalling the Asian financial crisis early in his career, he said, 鈥淚 saw grown men and women, experts, grizzled veterans, really losing it, or [they] didn鈥檛 know what to do. Not because they didn鈥檛 understand what was happening, but they didn鈥檛 have systems to deal with the crisis.鈥�

Things had changed by 2008, during the US subprime mortgage crisis. As the Philippines was not too adversely affected, Mr. Tarrobago called this a 鈥渕ini crisis,鈥� but more importantly, he had already begun to develop a system.

He said, 鈥淥ver the years, there were some mini crises in between, but in 2008, I already had a semblance of a system with me, but I was still learning to trust that system.

鈥淔ast forward to 2020 when the global crisis, the COVID lockdowns hit, I already had a system. So that allowed me to navigate the system. And that allowed my funds to outperform significantly and without the stress from the past crisis.鈥�

Forged in fire, he now shares these lessons in his mentorship, providing priceless knowledge and practices from the last three major global financial crises.

A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
To introduce his system 鈥� or the system he can help develop with you 鈥� he begins by talking about different assets. Each asset has a role to play in your portfolio, and he divides them between defensive assets (bonds and cash) and risk assets (equity and alternatives). For example, an aggressive investor who wants to earn big and is comfortable with risk may have 80% risk assets and 20% defensive assets in their portfolio while a balanced investor may have the assets split 50-50.

He tells investors to think of investment like a car where different parts have different roles to play. 鈥淒uring turbulent markets or financial conditions,鈥� he says, 鈥渂onds are your portfolio鈥檚 shock absorber. Normally, the bonds do well in high uncertainty, very turbulent market conditions. Whereas equities or stocks are your portfolio鈥檚 growth engine over time. That鈥檚 where wealth is built.鈥�

Keeping entrepreneurs 鈥� those businesspeople who always see opportunity in crisis 鈥� in mind, he added, 鈥淚n particular, it鈥檚 a good market for risk assets.鈥� Yet even for entrepreneurs like these, it can be difficult to overcome the tendency to react emotionally to falling markets. He reminded us, 鈥淎ll you want to do is protect yourself, driven by your prehistoric fight or flight responses. So, then you let that become your fund manager. It鈥檚 not usually the most rational decision, and oftentimes can be quite costly.鈥� But for investors with risk appetite, undervalued stocks may prove to be golden opportunities in the future.

For those who are interested in Jun Tarrobago鈥檚 mentorship, you can check out his Substack or his LinkedIn where he talks about a wide range of investment topics. He also holds a mini workshop as well as a six-week program which starts with investment basics then goes deep into frameworks and ends with how to use framework accelerators like AI.

RJ Ledesma () is a Hall of Fame Awardee for Best Male Host at the Aliw Awards, a multi-awarded serial entrepreneur, motivational speaker, and business mentor, podcaster, an Honorary Consul, and editor-in-chief of The Business Manual. Mr. Ledesma can be found on LinkedIn, Facebook and Instagram. The RJ Ledesma Podcast is available on Facebook, Spotify, Google and Apple Podcasts. Are there entrepreneurs you want Mr. Ledesma to interview? Let him know at ledesma.rj@gmail.com.

Sometime in 2025, VinFast and charging company V-Green made a public promise of up to 15,000 charging ports nationwide by the end of 2025, covering malls, expressways, commercial districts, and high-traffic zones. VinFast was selling cars. Cars need somewhere to charge. And the promise was part of the pitch.

But the target has not been met. VinFast Southeast Asia CEO Antonio Zara III has blamed the delay on inconsistent local government permit requirements, particularly how different local government units (LGUs) classify the installation of EV chargers in parking lots, with some treating it as a building renovation requiring a full permit.

I believe his regulatory complaint is legitimate. Permit inconsistency is a genuine problem in this country. But it is not a new one. And VinFast is not the first company to discover it the hard way. Rooftop solar installers have been fighting the same battle for years. The same goes for internet cable installers.

Without a nationwide policy on permit fee schedules, LGUs rely on their own resolutions to set prices, leading to confusion and delays. The fees vary, and so do timelines. In the case of charging stations, the classification of what counts as a simple electrical job versus a full building renovation varies.

In February, the Department of Energy (DoE) announced a whole-of-government push to speed up net-metering permits. Under the joint circular, LGUs must issue electrical permits for net-metering applications within three working days and Certificates of Final Electrical Inspection within seven working days.

If an LGU fails to act within those deadlines, the application is deemed approved.

But EV charging stations have no equivalent protection. Republic Act No. 11697, or the Electric Vehicle Industry Development Act, is the governing law. Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Department Order No. 136 (2025) provides technical construction guidelines. But there is no national rule that tells an LGU it must process a charging station permit within a fixed number of days.

Thus, the standard permitting timeline for a charging station still varies per LGU. And there is no hard deadline with a consequence for missing it. This is the structural gap that produced VinFast鈥檚 shortfall. But it is also a gap that VinFast should have known about before promising thousands of chargers by end-2025.

To date, some solar rooftops within Meralco鈥檚 service territory are suspected to remain unpermitted, referred to locally as 鈥済uerrilla solar.鈥� These installations exist because the formal permitting process can be slow, expensive, and inconsistent. Consumers chose immediate relief over regulatory compliance.

But the LGU permitting process is not arbitrary red tape. It is a system of protection for the property owner, for neighbors, and for the community. An unpermitted solar installation cannot legally participate in net metering. It is a liability that must be disclosed to any potential buyer. And in a typhoon, panels installed without a structural engineer鈥檚 sign-off can be torn from a roof and become projectiles. Electrical fire is another risk.

The same logic applies, but perhaps with greater force, to EV fast chargers. DC fast charging draws significant electrical load, generates heat, and introduces a different fire-risk profile. Lithium-ion battery thermal runaway can occur when a battery overheats in ways that conventional fire suppression cannot easily address.

EV charging is not a trivial electrical installation. You cannot think of it as simply plugging in an appliance. DPWH guidelines require an EV charging station site to have sufficient space, including a minimum dimension of 2.5 meters by five meters. They also require a reliable and stable power source capable of supporting the charger鈥檚 rated electrical demand. For DC fast charging, DPWH guidance also refers to a minimum bandwidth requirement of 10 Mbps per charging point, consistent with the connectivity needs of modern networked charging systems.

A parking building that gains a fast charger without proper electrical and fire-safety assessment is a building whose risk profile has changed in ways its original design did not anticipate. Thus, LGUs that treat EV charger installation as a serious building and electrical intervention are not necessarily being obstructionist.

The right response is not to bypass that judgment through emergency declarations. It is to standardize regulations nationally, the way the DoE did for solar installations in February, so that every LGU in the country applies the same rules on installing EV charging stations, on the same timeline, with the same consequences for delay.

That brings us to VinFast鈥檚 complaint. V-Green, the company building charging stations, is part of the same Vingroup ecosystem as VinFast. The free charging program VinFast offers runs until 2029, at V-Green-operated charging stations, and covers VinFast customers. It also applies to drivers using Green GSM transport services.

EV owners using other brands do not benefit from V-Green鈥檚 network the same way a VinFast owner does. The ports VinFast and V-Green announced are not a public good in the fullest sense. They are infrastructure that also serves a commercial strategy: support VinFast buyers, reduce their operating costs, and deepen loyalty to the brand.

I am not suggesting that this disqualifies the infrastructure. In a country with only 912 publicly accessible charging stations as of the end of March 2025, and a government target of around 7,300 public charging stations by 2028, every port counts.

But the moral weight of the argument shifts. A private company building brand-supporting infrastructure for its own customers is not the same as a public utility trying to serve the grid. The case for faster permitting is strong. The case for cutting safety corners is not.

Mr. Zara himself acknowledged that public safety is the LGU鈥檚 mandate and that VinFast does not want to compromise it. I take that at face value. But acknowledging safety while asking government to use emergency powers to accelerate a proprietary charging rollout does not sit well with me. Instead, the government should work out the rules for everybody鈥檚 benefit.

We are not just talking about one company鈥檚 missed target. We are talking about a pattern. The EV law was passed, and the DoE rollout targets were set shortly after. But the permitting framework was not built to match the ambition of the law. The same mismatch gave us guerrilla solar. It will give us guerrilla charging if we are not careful, with higher stakes because the fire-risk profile is more serious and the electrical load is heavier.

The answer is the same in both cases. Amend the building, electrical, and fire codes to classify EV charger installation by electrical load, fire risk, and structural impact, and not just by a building official鈥檚 discretion. If EV chargers are treated inconsistently by LGUs, then the answer is national clarification.

DPWH Department Order No. 136 (2025) already provides construction guidelines for EV charging stations. The next step should be to align those technical guidelines with building-code classification, electrical review, fire-safety requirements, and LGU permitting practice.

Clarify how the building, electrical, and fire codes, EVIDA (Electric Vehicle Industry Development Act), DPWH guidelines, DoE rules, and LGU permitting processes apply to EV charging installations. Publish uniform classification standards that every LGU can follow. Distinguish chargers according to actual electrical load, location, fire risk, and structural impact.

Talk of using an energy emergency to streamline permits should be handled carefully. That may sound practical. But in the Philippine context, emergency authority has a way of becoming a shortcut not only around delay, but also around discipline. Expediency should never compromise safety.

Marvin Tort is a former managing editor of 大象传媒, and a former chairman of the Philippine Press Council.

matort@yahoo.com

It was Thomas Kuhn in his 1962 book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions who first introduced the phrase, 鈥減aradigm shift鈥� to describe major changes in scientific thinking where elements of ambiguity are acceptable, as in quantum physics and the theory of relativity.

Here are examples of shifting paradigms in the sphere of business and commerce.

What happened to movie houses that used to be packed and considered automatic options for a nice date? Online streaming to giant home screens or even handheld phones has become the default mode for viewing movies.

Online transactions in banking, food pick-up, and shopping can be done from home too. There鈥檚 no need to visit a bookstore to browse or buy. Online purchase and even immediate reading are an option with e-books. The need to go out to do chores has shifted.

What about the workplace? The large offices to house a hundred or more employees have given way to a new paradigm. Are offices shifting to occasional use like a hotel (check-in as needed) rather than full occupancy like a second home? (Are the toilets clean?) The hybrid WFH arrangement has freed up space at offices in favor of the home (or the mall). Punctuality in reporting for work is no longer applicable.

Does anybody use paradigms (with its silent 鈥済鈥�) in ordinary conversation?

Using 鈥減aradigm鈥� in a sentence without the accompanying movement requires an unusual conversation to take place. (How did you get your paradigm to the mall?) Paradigms are not capable of any action other than shifting.

More common now, when describing a change in strategy, is the new 鈥渂usiness model.鈥� These two words are not joined at the hip like Siamese twins. The two nouns (鈥渂usiness鈥� and 鈥渕odel鈥�) have an open-minded arrangement allowing partnership with other nouns with no guilty feelings. (How is the new model? None of your business.)

A business model is straightforward. It describes a structure of how goods and services are bundled and delivered.

For example, the old business model of the ad agency consisted of a one-stop shop defining the brand鈥檚 marketing strategy, coming up with a creative campaign, and then putting this in a commercial placed in different media. The business model now (using the new paradigm of a mall rather than a supermarket) is unbundling these different services, and charging fees for services, instead of a commission on ad placements. They鈥檙e even on separate floors, or buildings.

Will people stop traveling for business meetings abroad with the advent of online communication? This prediction of such a shift in business travel was made 50 years ago even before the advent of video streaming through the phone or video screen. Business trips may have gone down, but there are still valid excuses to travel when hosted by a supplier. This is considered a 鈥減er diem鈥� shift.

Dispensing with the paradigm shift has not always led to a business model that is comprehensible. Still, the new phrase seems more accessible to consultants. After all, 鈥減aradigm shift鈥� as a scientific phrase for accepting uncertainty still requires a metaphor.

When old industries are wiped out by technology (like slide rules by calculators and those in turn by mobile phones and watches), some guru is sure to analyze failure as the result of technology change. Before reaching for a shifting paradigm, the analyst is likely to look at new business models.

The industrial revolution that created new economic centers shifted the paradigm from agriculture to manufacturing. The rise of the factory system that housed workers, machinery, and raw materials under one roof propelled the manufacturing economy. This too has already changed with the 鈥渙ff-shoring鈥� of the supply chain spread across the globe.

Metaphors and paradigms help us understand change before it becomes a new business model.

Life lessons from childhood are more easily understood with the use of analogies. The old folk wisdom of a mountain of money capable of being flattened by excessive spending or an addiction to politics or gambling still captures the imagination and shifts the paradigm鈥� from a mountain to a molehill.

Tony Samson is chairman and CEO of TOUCH xda.

ar.samson@yahoo.com

The demand for Filipino seafarers will grow as maritime trade continues to expand as it bounces back from the global crisis resulting from the US-Iran conflict in the Middle East. Although this trade will continue to develop, there are significant shifts in the horizon. Any opportunity or threat in maritime trade must not be overlooked, given how much of the global economy rests on it as we experienced in 2025.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), shipping trade amounted to 12,292 million tons worth of volume in 2023, with an average projected growth of 2.4% from 2025 to 2029. The growth was even more marked in ton-miles at 4.2% from 2022 to 2023, given shifting trade patterns that resulted from increases in US tariffs, supply chain uncertainties brought about by international disputes such as the war in Ukraine, and climate change.

One clear sign of trade shifts is the fact that the 鈥渁verage distances traveled per ton of cargo have been increasing since 2005, with the average voyage estimated at 4,675 miles in 2000 and 5,186 miles in 2024,鈥� as the UNCTAD study reported. These shifts should be closely monitored as developing economies rely more heavily on these shipments for growth than the developed ones. The 2021 transport work intensity (TWI) in developing economies for both exports and imports were twice as much as those recorded for the developed ones.

Hence, the demand for seafarers from developing economies will increase even more as these countries鈥� trade continues to intensify, and their working populations continue to expand. For example, as Philippine conglomerates increasingly invest in corporate farming (bamboo, high-value coconut, palm oil, coffee, etc.) following the example of Vietnam, there will be an increasing demand for manning services as these products are exported. The same can be said for the prospects of increased exports of high-value semiconductor components and processed mineral ores as the US and Japan invest heavily in the so-called Luzon Economic Corridor in order to attract the manufacture of these products to the Philippines and away from China for geopolitical reasons.

The steady increase in the global fleet lends a lot of opportunities for the Philippine economy in general and the manning services industry and Filipino seafarers in particular. Broadly speaking, the global fleet is expected to grow at a slower 3.2% to 3.3% (lower than the average 5.2% recorded from 2005 to 2023). As a benchmark, in January 2024, the global fleet, including both cargo and non-cargo, came to 109,000 vessels with the equivalent capacity of around 2.4 billion deadweight tons (DWT). Most of the 2023 to 2024 growth in the global fleet capacity was driven by container ships (42.7% of total capacity) at 7% annual growth, and liquefied gas carriers (4% of total capacity) at 6.4% annual growth. While oil tankers also composed a significant 28.3% of total capacity, it had grown only at 1.9% in the same period.

This fleet growth, however, is accompanied by ageing. The report states that by the start of 2024, the global fleet age was 12.5 years by DWT and 22.4 years by vessel count. This aged 2% more than in 2023, and over three years more mature than the average age in the past decade. This means that the industry as a whole 鈥渨ill not be operating a younger, more efficient and environmentally sustainable fleet.鈥�

It is not that there is a lack of new technology: there are retrofitting options, new orders in specific ship types like bulk carriers, and the existence of 鈥渆co-design鈥� ships. Rather, ships cannot be so easily retired as they have to address rerouting and increased distance-adjusted demand for ships. Renewal progress is slow because of 鈥渓imited ship demolition activity due to factors such as strong charter markets and demand for shipping capacity arising from disruptions and increased distances,鈥� effectively 鈥渆xtending the lifespan of older vessels and delaying their removal.鈥�

In any case, there are orders for newer, greener ships coming in, although slightly less than previously recorded.

The report stated that as regards ship manufacturing in 2023, 鈥渢he global ship outlook increased by 9.8% in terms of vessels and by 9.1% in terms of capacity; this is less than three times the increase in 2022. Limited availability of berths at shipyards and high prices for newbuilds (also) contributed to moderating growth.鈥� The tempered growth hence comes with adjustments from the shipyards regarding their capacity and variety of ship builds. For instance, more recent orders shifted to LNG carriers (50% of active capacity), tankers (7.5%), and bulkers (9.7%).

Container ships still account for around 25% of the orderbook鈥檚 active capacity but are waning after the order highs seen in 2021 and 2022. On the other hand, there is also an inherent time lag in the shipping cycle when it comes to aligning demand and supply due to the immediate shift in shipping needs versus the long lead time of ship manufacturing.

In 2023 and the first half of 2024, the supply of ship capacity and vessel utilization were shaped by system inefficiencies and new opportunities to deploy fleet capacity arising from ongoing supply chain disruptions and rerouting. An example is the use of 鈥渟hadow鈥� fleets (particularly in tankers) amplified by the continued war in Ukraine and reinforced by the latest disruptions. The trend has reinforced the service life for existing ships, boosted ship sales and purchases, increased second-hand prices, slashed ship demolition levels, and motivated some investments in newbuilt vessels. It still remains to be seen how the US-Iran war will modify this trend.

These ships, whether new or old, are subject to a range of operational decisions, including some adjustments, capacity expansion, priority for cargo types, and flag state registration. For instance, while fleet capacity has grown much faster than maritime volume, shifts in shipping routes (especially due to the situation at the Strait of Hormuz during the ongoing US-Iran war) as well as supply chain uncertainties, have largely mitigated the effects of this surplus. Another observable operational trend is the registration of ships under the flag of developing economies, despite the fact that the majority of these vessels are owned by entities based in developed countries.

It is obvious that global industry forces, especially after the disruption to international trade caused by the US-Iran war, will lead to dynamic changes in the shipping industry on several fronts: the number of ships in the global fleet, the variety of ships needed, and the registration-ownership patterns. The manning services industry and the seafaring workforce should be able to ride on or preferably ahead of these dynamic and growing shifts in the global shipping sector.

One thing is sure: as we continue to benefit from our demographic dividend, despite our falling fertility rate, the Philippines will continue to be dominant in the seafaring workforce. As is happening in all the industrial sectors of the Philippines, there should be a constant effort to reskill, upskill and retool our seafarers.

Bernardo M. Villegas has a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard, is professor emeritus at the University of Asia and the Pacific, and a visiting professor at the IESE Business School in Barcelona, Spain. He was a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

bernardo.villegas@uap.asia

But times are rapidly evolving. Threats are no longer confined to the three common domains. Technology has driven great changes in the way nations maintain and protect their borders.

Cyberspace has emerged as an important new domain in modern defense and security. States seeking to antagonize others or advance their interests at the expense of the established international order increasingly rely on sophisticated digital tools to do so. These cybersecurity threats can target individuals, organizations, critical infrastructure, and nations. The consequences range from financial losses, to breaches of privacy, damage to reputations, and the theft of sensitive information. When critical infrastructure is attacked, the effects can be especially severe, causing widespread disruption.

During last week鈥檚 forum called 鈥淏uilding Credible Deterrence Through a Multi-Domain Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization,鈥� organized by the Stratbase Group in partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) Philippines, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner, Jr., through a message delivered by Acting Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the Civil-Military Operations Command Lieutenant General Arvin Lagamon, emphasized that 鈥渁 credible deterrent posture requires an AFP that can think, adapt, innovate, and operate in emerging domains of warfare.鈥�

This is why the 鈥渃yber domain has become a major area of focus.鈥� Recognizing this reality, the AFP continues to strengthen its cyber capabilities and is pursuing a more robust cyber command structure.

Yet strengthening deterrence across multiple domains also requires confronting the long-standing constraints surrounding AFP modernization. Major General Ivan D. R. Papera, Chief of the AFP Systems Engineering and Modernization Office, acknowledged during the same forum that years of limited budgets forced the military into a 鈥減iecemeal approach鈥� to capability acquisition, often resulting in interoperability challenges from what he described as 鈥渃hop suey鈥� procurement from different countries.

As the Philippines approaches the 10^th anniversary of the landmark 2016 arbitral ruling amid an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific region, credible deterrence will depend on its ability to secure all domains 鈥� not only those visible above the surface, but also those hidden beneath it.

Amid international reports of subsea cable-cutting incidents and local reports of underwater drones with Chinese markings discovered in various parts of the Philippines, it is becoming increasingly clear that the submarine domain represents the next strategic frontier that underpins national security, economic stability, connectivity, and regional trade.

As an archipelagic state located at the center of vital maritime routes in the Indo-Pacific, the Philippines cannot afford to neglect what happens beneath the surface. The Philippine Seas also serve as home to submarine cables that connect major economic players such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, and many others. These submarine cables form part of the invisible infrastructure that powers the global economy. They carry financial transactions, internet traffic, government communications, military communications, and critical data flows that sustain modern societies and economies.

These developments are happening faster and with greater coordination. Vulnerability in one domain can quickly create risks in another. For an archipelagic nation like the Philippines, understanding and protecting what happens beneath the surface is imperative.

Fortunately, the Armed Forces has long acknowledged that it has to step up to meet the challenges of the times. The modern battlefield is now multi-domain, highly technological, and constantly evolving, demanding faster, more integrated, and more adaptive defense capabilities.

Foremost, the AFP launched the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept reflecting the pivot to external defense, allowing it to defend sea lanes of communication and protect maritime territories more effectively.

Part of this shift is recognizing the need to invest in assets and capabilities that can strengthen the country鈥檚 awareness, monitoring, and presence in the underwater domain. Investments in submarines, underwater surveillance systems, maritime domain awareness technologies, and undersea infrastructure protection capabilities should increasingly become part of the country鈥檚 long-term modernization agenda.

Mr. Papera also pointed out that modernization should not be viewed merely as an expense, but as an investment in the country鈥檚 long-term security and deterrence capabilities. This is especially important as the AFP seeks to move beyond simple procurement toward more integrated capability development across multiple domains.

It is here that the necessity of collaborating with like-minded nations becomes paramount. We have too many competing priorities and remain constrained by financial and technical limitations. It is reassuring that our military leadership remains fully aware of these evolving threats and is mindful of the need for constant retooling and modernization.

More importantly, however, we must not allow ourselves to be distracted from this aim. More than the personalities that dominate the issues of the day, remaining conscious of geopolitical dangers and defending what is ours across all domains is a fundamental responsibility we owe to our people and our nation.

Victor Andres 鈥淒indo鈥� C. Manhit is the president of the Stratbase ADR Institute.

Section 34(H) of the Tax Code allows taxpayers to recognize a limited deduction equivalent to 10% of taxable income for individual taxpayers, and 5% of taxable income for corporate taxpayers who contribute to Donee Institutions. The contribution or gift should be for the use of accredited domestic corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, youth and sports development, cultural, or educational purposes, for the rehabilitation of veterans, to social welfare institutions, or to non-government organizations (Accredited NGOs), in accordance with regulations of the Secretary of Finance (SoF), upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).

The Tax Code allows full deductibility of contributions made to Accredited NGOs, provided the following conditions are present: 1.) the accredited NGO shall utilize the contributions directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated, not later than the 15^th day of the third month after the close of the accredited NGO鈥檚 taxable year in which contributions are received, unless extended; 2.) the level of administrative expenses of the Accredited NGO shall, on an annual basis, not exceed 30% of the total expenses; 3.) in the event of dissolution, the assets of the Accredited NGO would be distributed to another Accredited NGO organized for similar purposes, or to the State for public purpose; 4.) the amount of any charitable contribution of property other than money shall be based on the acquisition cost of said property; and, 5.) all the members of the Board of Trustees do not receive compensation or remuneration for their services to the aforementioned organization.

Section 101(A) of the Tax Code recognizes a full exemption from donor鈥檚 tax, but adds that not more than 30% of said gifts shall be used by such donee for administrative purposes.

In 1998, the Department of Finance issued Revenue Regulation No. 13-98 to implement Section 34(H) of the Tax Code (RR 13-98). The SoF identified the Philippine Council for NGO Certification, Inc. (PCNC) as the 鈥淎ccrediting Agency.鈥� RR 13-98 described the PCNC as being comprised of several NGO networks, namely: the Caucus of Development NGO Networks, Philippine Business for Social Progress, the Association of Foundations, the League of Corporate Foundations, the Bishops-Businessmen鈥檚 Conference for Human Development, and the National Council for Social Development Foundation. The PCNC was required to examine and evaluate non-stock, non-profit corporations and NGOs as a prerequisite for their registration with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a qualified donee institution based on the following major criteria: a.) mission and goals; b.) resources; c.) program implementation and evaluation; and, d.) planning for the future.

In 2003, Executive Order No. 221 was issued, mandating the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to license, accredit, and provide consultative services to social welfare and development agencies (SWDAs) or any other institutions and organizations engaged in social welfare activities. As a result, in 2008, EO 720 was issued to further strengthen the accreditation system, adding the DSWD as a member of the Board of Trustees of the PCNC.

Most recently, on May 7, Executive Order No. 117 (EO 117) was promulgated, designating the DSWD as the sole accrediting entity for SWDAs. SWDAs are defined in Republic Act No. 4373 (RA 4373) as non-stock, non-profit corporations, organizations or associations engaged in providing, directly or indirectly, social welfare and development programs and services, and obtains its finances, either totally or in part, from any government agency or instrumentality, whether foreign or local, or from the community by direct or indirect solicitations, and other fund-generating activities. SWDAs are required to employ a sufficient number of qualified and registered social workers who shall supervise and take charge of its social work functions, in accordance with accepted social work standards of the Philippine Regulatory Board for Social Workers.

Currently, SWDAs are required to secure two separate accreditations 鈥� one from the PCNC as a precondition for registration with the BIR, and another from the DSWD for regulatory compliance. The definition of SWDAs appears to overlap with Accredited NGOs in RR 13-98. EO 117, however, has directed that it is the DSWD that will act as the sole accrediting entity for SWDAs, removing them from the jurisdiction of the PCNC, citing the 2018 Ease of Doing Business (EODB) and Efficient Government Service Delivery Act.

The SoF, CIR, and DSWD have been directed to issue necessary implementing rules aligned with EO 117. To ensure the streamlining of the accreditation process in line with the EODB, the rules should address and define the requirements for classifications of Donee Institutions, whether as Accredited NGOs or SWDAs. The rules must be clear as to who are still covered by the PCNC. Moreover, the rules should incorporate criteria ensuring that accredited Donee Institutions shall make utilization directly for the active conduct of social welfare purposes, aligned with the very thrust and objective behind the grant of the tax exemptions.

(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. This article is for general information and educational purposes, and is not offered as, and does not constitute, legal advice or legal opinion.)

Rozina E. Salcedo is an associate of the Tax department of the Angara Abello Concepcion Regala Cruz Law Offices.

Did you know that wastewater is being monitored by DENR-EMB, and there are about 17,000 industries around the country that they look after, to ensure that all effluent water is managed and treated? That ensures that we can then have clean water for everyone to use. It was so interesting to know the different classes of water 鈥� from 鈥渟afe to drink鈥� to 鈥渟afe to just bathe in鈥� and 鈥渟afe just to float a boat in.鈥� Imagine the agency trying to monitor these businesses even if all they have is a single toilet facility or one water closet. For as long as you discharge water, you are in the purview of Engineer Sibunga鈥檚 department.

She walked us through the challenges of her work because of errant companies may just pay the penalty but still not comply fully with wastewater laws. She gave an extreme example of a restaurant that simply washed knives and had no toilets. But when you wash, you still have wastewater and you have to ensure you find a way to treat it. But the big offenders are really the extractive industries, like mining and electronics manufacturing. Asked what the most dangerous substances are in our wastewater, and she mentioned heavy metals like cadmium, lead, and mercury. Those are toxic for humans and all forms of life.

And this is why we need to prevail upon industry owners and leaders to understand how their business operations can affect our water supply. It is not enough to be able to afford the penalty. What is required is that we attend a Pollution Control seminar as executives 鈥� even for just eight hours 鈥� to know that our business is responsible enough to treat our wastewater. We actually had her laymanize all the scientific tables which we understood after her brief explanation during the webinar.

There are many laws to protect the environment, and it takes a lot to enforce them because even Local Government Units (LGUS) are involved in the inspection and implementation of the law. We asked: But what if the local executive is involved in the errant company? She smiled and said she may have to get the Philippine National Police (PNP) to help as the DENR has no police power. The DENR simply has the parameters and knowledge of the law and the danger these errant companies can cause to pollute the environment.

Further, some fines have been overtaken by inflation and are now too affordable for companies who do not comply with the law. The laws need to be reviewed so the fines and penalties can be more onerous and painful for offenders. If using the carrot and stick method, with the 鈥渟tick鈥� being fines and penalties, what are the 鈥渃arrots鈥�? What are the incentives so companies will comply with the laws? There used to be tax incentives when the law was passed, but these were only good for 10 years. That has long expired, and nothing compels companies to try and comply with cleaning the water they discharge. Except for the moral obligation that CEOs must abide by. If your industry is a pollutant or prospective pollutant because of the nature of your business (manufacturing, electronics, mining, etc.), you should be mindful of the waste water you produce and ensure that you return 鈥渃leaned up鈥� or treated water to the system.

So, we ask executives 鈥� CEOs and COOs 鈥�听 to attend the enlightening eight-hour seminar of the DENR-EMB along with their Pollution Control Officers (PCOs) so they have a better understanding (and undergo moral suasion) to prevent damage to the environment. This way, our companies will not only be compliant, we can be a more responsible company that sets examples for others. It could also be a competitive advantage once our consumers find out we are not a polluting business, but a caring one.

Ms. Sibunga is hopeful that if more company leaders understood the Water Quality regulations, the more companies will comply, and the DENR will achieve their goal of making sure there is clean water for everyone.

We call upon our legislators as well to look into the penalties which have been rendered affordable by inflation. They are too cheap compared to the damage dirty water can cause to agricultural crops, to the water that goes through our water distributors, and even to our drinking water.

We looked at each other during the webinar because what we had in front of us was bottled water 鈥� and why do we drink bottled water? Because we are unsure about the safety of our tap water, and oftentimes establishments need to install filters to make sure our tap water is safe to consume.

We have the laws. In fact, we have a lot of good laws to protect the environment, but enforcement is the challenge for many agencies, including the DENR-EMB. There seems to be a lack of personnel and budget to monitor the growing number of firms whose activities affect our water systems. Maybe with the use of AI and advancement in technology, we may just be able to monitor better and reward those who care and punish those who don鈥檛. In the meantime, take a look at your company and be inspired to do something about it. Remember, the damage you cause may just end up in your own drinking water.

(This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not reflect the official stand of the Management Association of the Philippines or MAP.)

Chit U. Juan is the co-chair of the MAP Environment Committee. She is also the chair of the Philippine Coffee Board, Inc. and Slow Food Manila.

map@map.org.ph

pujuan29@gmail.com

For decades, the country鈥檚 budgeting framework has been held together by a patchwork of laws, executive issuances, administrative practices and, as I would humor the late Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Secretary Emy Boncodin, budget practices in the minds of our budget experts, like Secretary Boncodin. Core provisions still trace back to the Administrative Code of 1987. Many of the most important reforms in public financial management exist not in statute, but in circulars and evolving practice 鈥� fragile, reversible, and unevenly applied.

This is not a system designed for consistency or accountability. It is a system that has adapted over time 鈥� but without a coherent legal foundation.

A Budgeting Code promises to fix that. But whether it actually does depends on a more uncomfortable question: Will it strengthen the guardrails of the public purse 鈥� or simply formalize the system we already have?

BRIDGING POLICY AND PRACTICE
A Budgeting Code is often presented as a technical exercise. It should not be.

At its core, budget codification is an attempt to align two dimensions of governance that, in the Philippine context, are frequently misaligned.

On one hand is public finance as policy architecture. It is the Constitution鈥檚 design for controlling the most dangerous form of power in government: the power over public money. It allocates authority, imposes limits, and embeds accountability across institutions. It answers the structural questions: Who may tax? Who may appropriate? Who may spend? Who must account?

On the other hand, the budget is where that architecture is inhabited. It is the point where constitutional principles leave the text and enter the real world. Every year, through the budget, the abstract rules of public finance are tested against political pressures, economic urgency, constituency priorities, and human discretion. The budget is not merely a financial plan; it is a law, and more than that, it is the Constitution at work.

In theory, the budget is the most precise expression of policy.

In practice, it is often the product of accommodation, a lived reality 鈥� where priorities are negotiated, reshaped, and sometimes diluted in the course of allocation and implementation.

A Budgeting Code, if it is to mean anything, must bridge this gap. Otherwise, it risks becoming little more than a well-organized description of a system that does not consistently work as intended.

THE PHILIPPINE REALITY
The gap between policy and practice in Philippine budgeting is not incidental. It is structural.

The legal framework remains fragmented. Key rules are dispersed across multiple sources, with important aspects of budgeting left to administrative discretion rather than anchored in law.

More critically, the real vulnerabilities of the system emerge after the budget is enacted.

It is at the point of execution 鈥� when funds are released, realigned, and utilized 鈥� that discretion expands, and transparency often thins out. The connection between what Congress appropriates and what is actually spent becomes less visible, and therefore less accountable.

At the same time, the continued reliance on special purpose funds and similar mechanisms has made the budget more complex than it needs to be 鈥� adding layers that can obscure rather than clarify how public resources are allocated.

The result is a system where the budget reflects not only national priorities, but also the realities of negotiation, accommodation, and, at times, political pressure.

CODIFICATION: NECESSARY, BUT NOT SUFFICIENT
A Budgeting Code can address some of these weaknesses.

It can bring coherence to a fragmented system, institutionalize reforms, and reduce the excessive reliance on administrative issuances. These are real and important gains.

But codification is not reform in itself.

The central problem is not simply the absence of a comprehensive legal framework. It is the persistent gap between rules and reality.

A Budgeting Code can organize the system. It cannot, on its own, discipline it.

Without stronger safeguards in budget execution, more meaningful transparency, and effective oversight, codification risks doing something far less ambitious than reform: It risks legitimizing existing practices by giving them the appearance of structure.

CODIFICATION IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM
This is where the discussion must become more candid.

Budget reform in the Philippines is not constrained by a lack of technical knowledge. It is constrained by the political environment within which the budget operates.

The strong emphasis on administrative rules and procedures in current proposals reflects a bureaucracy that understands its limits. Budget institutions operate in a system where political actors wield considerable influence over the allocation of public resources. Faced with this reality, technocratic reform tends to focus on what it can control 鈥� the legal and administrative framework 鈥� while avoiding the more difficult terrain of political incentives.

This is not a failure of understanding.

It is an adaptation to power.

But it also defines the limits of what a Budgeting Code, on its own, can achieve.

Because the most important guardrails of the budget are not merely procedural. They are institutional 鈥� and ultimately political.

THE GUARDRAILS THAT MATTER
The Philippines does not simply need a more organized budget system. It needs one that is more disciplined, more transparent, and more accountable.

A Budgeting Code can be a step in that direction 鈥� but only if it does more than codify procedures. It must strengthen the safeguards that ensure that public funds are used as intended, and that deviations from those intentions are visible and accountable. Otherwise, the reform risks being largely cosmetic.

The real test of a Budgeting Code is not whether it makes the system easier to describe. It is whether it makes the system harder to misuse. Because in the end, the budget is not just a financial plan. It is an exercise of power.

And the question that any serious reform must answer is simple: Who controls that power 鈥� and what constrains it?

In the next column, we will examine the political economy of the budget process 鈥� and why reform requires not just better rules, but the will to enforce them.

Atty. Florencio 鈥淏utch鈥� B. Abad was formerly the secretary of the Department of Budget and Management. Currently, he is a professor of Praxis听 at the Ateneo School of Government. He is also a senior professional lecturer at the DLSU Ta帽ada-Diokno School of Law.

While our overall inflation last month was 7.2%, inflation in the transport sector was 21.4% and that of people鈥檚 operation of their cars, motorcycles, etc. was 66%.

I checked the electricity rates on the Meralco website and saw that the generation charge in the May billing was 17.8% higher than May last year鈥檚. The transmission charge has increased mainly because of the addition of ancillary services (battery and backup oil-gas peaking plants) as more intermittent renewable energy (RE) without battery is added to the grid. The distribution charge is flat while subsidies to off-grid areas and islands via the universal charge for missionary electrification (UC-ME) has increased (see Table 1).

Last week, the Independent Electricity Market Operator of the Philippines (IEMOP) released the Market Operations Highlights for April and reflected on the May billing. It covered February to April. The share of coal in the energy mix at the Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM) has decreased, from 61% in February-April 2024 to 57% in February-April 2026, while the share of solar energy has almost doubled, from 3.6% to 6.3% over the same period.

Spot prices have increased from P4.52 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) in April 2025 to P5.63/kWh in April 2026, mainly because the power margin decreased from 4,585 megawatts (MW) to 4,427 MW over the same period (see Table 2).

The bottom-line is, in both WESM prices and the overall generation rate, the electricity price increase is lower than transport inflation but higher than overall inflation.

Most people accepted and adjusted to the very high fuel prices in March and April without subsidies. There is little justification for electricity subsidies 鈥� we have to adjust for these are externally caused price shocks.

MARKET SUSPENSION, LINE RENTAL DISTORTION
The WESM market was suspended from March 26 to April 30. There seems to be a distortion in the payment of line rental (the difference in prices of the generator and customer node corresponding to their bilateral contract declaration or bcq).

The Modified Admin Price (MAP) of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) was meant to maximize coal output and minimize LNG and oil because the rise in the price of coal was much lower than the rise in oil and gas prices. The ERC issued a fixed MAP of P6/kWh for coal to be used for spot energy only, but the implementation of MAP P6 became a nodal price.

Then there was another price, the customer MAP which averages the coal price and the original admin price. Thus, there were three different prices per interval which created the difference in nodal prices, and resulted in line rentals which should not have happened.

There were losers and winners. Coal plants, with their bcq counterparties during the morning to afternoon, have negative line rentals while other technologies have high positive line rentals. Technologies or customers who benefit from negative line rental will not give back, while gencos or customers affected by high line rental payments will not pay.

To avoid distortion, the fixed coal price under MAP should have been used only for spot sales of the coal plant and not applied as their nodal price.

POWER DISRUPTION, YELLOW-RED ALERTS
For three days last week (May 13 to 15) we saw yellow and red alerts raised in the Visayas and Luzon grids.

There was unscheduled maintenance in some big coal plants in Cebu, and the National Grid Corp. of the Philippine鈥檚 (NGCP) 500-kilovolt (kV) Tayabas鈥揑lijan and Ilijan鈥揇asmari帽as transmission lines tripped, which in turn disconnected 2,462 MW of natural gas capacity by LNGPH, particularly the Ilijan (South Premiere Power Corp. or SPPC) Blocks A and B and Excellent Energy Resources, Inc. (EERI) Units 1, 2, and 3, which were disconnected from the Luzon grid and triggered widespread power interruptions across Luzon.

It also prevented the transfer of power from the Luzon to Visayas grid.

In addition, Masinloc Unit 3 (325 MW) had a forced outage.

The Department of Energy (DoE) mobilized the Grid Reliability Task Force (GRTF) composed of the DoE, ERC, IEMOP, the National Transmission Corp. (TransCo) and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp. (PSALM).

ERC Chairman and CEO Francis Saturnino C. Juan visited the System Operations Command Center and wrote to NGCP President and CEO Anthony L. Almeda seeking a detailed account covering date, time, duration of each yellow and red alert, areas affected, generating units, and transmission lines, among others.

The rotating hours-long blackouts via manual load dropping (MLD) in many areas of Visayas and Luzon was bad. It further showed that the most expensive electricity is no electricity 鈥� not P15/kWh but available electricity, but rather P1/kWh electricity when there are no kilowatts available.

DOE鈥橲 COMPLAINT VS LEVISTE
On May 6, the DoE filed a criminal complaint against Congressman Leandro Legarda-Leviste and his solar firm, Solar Para sa Bayan Corp. (SPSB/SPBC), for failing to operate its national franchise, citing a seven-year period of total project inactivity.

DoE Secretary Sharon S. Garin personally lodged the complaint before the National Prosecution Service of the Department of Justice, saying that 鈥淭o this date, no application whatsoever has been lodged by SPSB/SPBC, nor has any report been filed regarding its compliance with the terms and conditions of the franchise. Interestingly, when the legislative franchise was granted in 2019, SPSB/SPBC had no single project or operation to speak of.鈥�

The DoE said it has no record that the company applied for the permits and approvals required by law, renewable energy projects were instead established and operated for profit through a separate group of companies under the umbrella of Solar Philippines Power Project Holdings, Inc. (SPPPHI), wholly owned by Mr. Leviste. See 鈥淓nergy dep鈥檛 files complaint vs Leviste, firm over idle solar projects鈥� (大象传媒, May 7).

The congressman should answer the DoE complaint and pay the P24-billion penalty for its failure to deliver its commitments to develop some 11,400 MW of solar farms under 42 Service Contracts (SCs) with the DoE from 2017-2022 and thus contribute to the finance department鈥檚 revenue collections. This instead of indulging in politicking irrelevant to energy development and avoiding paying the penalties.

Bienvenido S. Oplas, Jr. is the president of Bienvenido S. Oplas, Jr. Research Consultancy Services, and Minimal Government Thinkers. He is an internationa fellow of the Tholos Foundation.

minimalgovernment@gmail.com

TALK of a 鈥溾�� developing in 2026 is gaining momentum, with concerns rising that this climate pattern could bring , and destructive flooding around the world.

The signals appear to be in place: The tropical Pacific is warming along the equator, and computer models point toward .

However, forecasting El Ni帽o is not like predicting next week鈥檚 weather. Forecasts for El Ni帽o 鈥� not because scientists don鈥檛 understand the system, but because we understand its limits.

As an , I spend a lot of time thinking about what scientists can forecast confidently 鈥� and what remains uncertain. Here鈥檚 what we know about the current event, what we still don鈥檛, and why many regions should begin preparing now, even if a strong, or 鈥渟uper,鈥� El Ni帽o never fully materializes.

WHY IS EL NI脩O HARD TO FORECAST IN SPRING
The starting point for any El Ni帽o forecast is the . Computer models use data about those conditions to simulate how ocean temperatures will evolve over the coming months, and how they affect weather patterns around the world.

Right now, an exceptionally large reservoir of warm water sits beneath the surface there. In principle, this ocean heat should be a reliable signal of El Ni帽o developing. In practice, what happens next depends heavily on what the atmosphere does.

The warm reservoir was shaped by a burst of wind activity in early 2026. Normally, the Pacific trade winds blow from east to west along the equator, pushing warm water toward Asia and leaving cooler water near South America. But in April, caused the wind direction to reverse. This short-lived reversal triggered a downwelling Kelvin wave 鈥� a pulse of energy beneath the ocean surface moving eastward along the equator.

That subsurface pulse has now reached the eastern Pacific, helping fuel intense warming off South America. At the ocean surface, .

But there is a catch.

For El Ni帽o to develop fully, the ocean and atmosphere need to lock into a feedback loop: , triggering more downwelling Kelvin waves that push warm water eastward and reinforce the warming. But that loop doesn鈥檛 engage automatically. It requires repeated bursts of eastward winds to sustain the process.

Until that feedback loop takes hold, the ocean-atmosphere system is in an unpredictable phase. It might tip into a super El Ni帽o. It might not.

Spring is precisely . Impressive early signals can fade if the winds don鈥檛 cooperate.

There鈥檚 a further complication: When models detect strong subsurface warming, they can simulate a stronger feedback loop than actually develops.

The result is that 鈥� even alarming 鈥� despite the system not being locked in. As of mid-May, the wind patterns needed to amplify the warming have not clearly emerged.

We鈥檝e seen this scenario play out before. In both and , forecast models were pointing toward strong El Ni帽o conditions by midyear. In both cases, the anticipated wind patterns never fully materialized, and El Ni帽o either stayed weak or returned to a neutral state. The early signals were real, but the expected follow-through didn鈥檛 happen.

SO WHAT DO THE FORECASTS SUGGEST?
The current forecasts for 2026-27 still span a wide range in mid-May 鈥� from expecting .

How the winds behave in the coming weeks will determine what develops. If trade winds weaken again at the right moment, it could tip the system into self-sustaining warming 鈥� the kind that鈥檚 hard to stop.

As of mid-May, long-range weather forecasts that could strengthen El Ni帽o. In fact, quite the opposite was expected for the second half of May: a burst of winds blowing in the opposite direction. A full month without major eastward wind activity would be a meaningful brake on ocean warming.

The Pacific has loaded the dice for El Ni帽o, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration鈥檚 (NOAA) reflects elevated odds of El Ni帽o developing and potentially strengthening later in the year. By NOAA鈥檚 mid-June update, the picture should be substantially clearer.

EL NI脩O INTENSITY MATTERS FOR WEATHER WORLDWIDE
The difference between a weak El Ni帽o and an extreme one is not subtle. It reshapes climate patterns across the globe 鈥� and with them, real-world risks.

If El Ni帽o intensifies into a strong or 鈥渟uper鈥� event, it can drive drought in the Amazon, fires in Indonesia, flooding in Peru, and heavy rainfall in parts of California and southern South America. These effects could materialize by the Northern Hemisphere winter, when El Ni帽o typically peaks.

In some regions, the stakes are immediate.

In India, the for hundreds of millions of people, have historically weakened during strong El Ni帽o events. Even modest shifts in monsoon strength can bring food and water shortages, and harm economies.

At the same time, when El Ni帽o is strong, is typically suppressed 鈥� a rare upside 鈥� while the eastern Pacific often becomes more active with storms.

El Ni帽o can even , as changes in cloud cover and the amount of heat the ocean releases alter the planet鈥檚 energy balance.

In contrast, a weak El Ni帽o produces far more muted effects. This is why predicting intensity matters.

USING UNCERTAIN FORECASTS IN REAL-WORLD DECISIONS
Because El Ni帽o forecasts deal in probabilities, deciding how to prepare for the seasons ahead should be based on managing risk 鈥� not waiting for certainty.

El Ni帽o鈥檚 impact does not occur everywhere at once. Some effects emerge quickly. Its impact on the Indian monsoon and Atlantic hurricane activity unfold over the summer and early fall.

Other impacts arrive later, toward the end of the year when El Ni帽o peaks, bringing extreme rainfall to parts of South America between November and January. In Southeast Asia, , in April of the following year.

In regions like India, decisions about how to respond to El Ni帽o risks cannot wait for more certainty. Communities need to prepare their water infrastructure now in case El Ni帽o means the monsoon season brings too little rain.

Even where forecasts suggest reduced risks 鈥� such as a 鈥� it would be a mistake to assume safety. Destructive hurricanes .

THE CONVERSATION VIA REUTERS CONNECT

is an associate research professor in Climate Modeling at the University of Colorado Boulder. He receives funding from NSF and NOAA. He is affiliated with the ATLAS Institute at the University of Colorado.

Following on from Part One*, it bears adding that Ukrainian drone designers deployed, constantly recalibrated and redirected design, retested, and redeployed during actual war. It is an argument for high pressure creation of innovative solutions in, as it is in this case, the direst possible circumstances.

Ukraine may yet win their defensive war with Russia. Vladimir Putin鈥檚 ability to replace dead soldiers (sent to battle with minimum preparation and even less motivation) is next to nil at this point. This year鈥檚 big annual Victory Day parade in Moscow, that usually featured Brobdinagian armaments rolling in front of the Kremlin, had to be severely scaled down.

Putin essentially admitted to a precautionary mutedness of tone, because of the possibility of a Ukrainian drone attack. In Red Square. In the heart of Moscow.

Volodomyr Zelensky has prosecuted a war against Russian aggression that has relied on a startlingly successful combination of imagination and discipline. Right now, many of these drones can hit targets even during defensive electronic fogs.

Right now, Ukraine鈥檚 ability to make, use, and sell drones has lessened its dependence on the help of the US. And right now, it is collaborating with Germany on an analogue to the US MIM-114 Patriot system against Russian ballistic missiles.

The nature of warfare at this juncture of world history has unexpectedly changed.

This change was detectible quite early in this Russo-Ukrainian War. Cheap, almost toy drones allowed Ukrainian civilians to slip quickly into significant roles in the war as savvy drone operators.

LEGO AGIT-PROP
A similar change is less detectible in the current war between Iran and the United States. But it is no less startling.

鈥淚ran has done to the US what Ukraine did to Russia,鈥� says the globally respected Iranian-Swedish political analyst Trita Parsi. Iran has been upping investments in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), a.k.a drones.

As early 2019, the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported that 鈥淯AVs are Iran鈥檚 most rapidly advancing air capability.鈥� This development had apparently been in play for a decade before the US attacked this year and the drones have been making up for the shortfall in the number of replacements to aging military aircraft.

But there is something more inventive and extremely new in Iran鈥檚 arsenal, and it is defensive as well as offensive. It is the use of Lego animation in online anti-US agit-prop.

Almost everyone online has seen the videos. As many as a billion views have been generated by the mini narratives making dark fun of the foibles of President Donald Trump, his Secretary of Defense, and the US itself.

These quickly produced, current events-targeted, anime-infused videos are switching the Western-produced tropes about a terrorist, bloodthirsty Iran for fresh story: technologically savvy visual storytellers in universally understood languages of satire and mockery are also Iran.

The monster Lego videos are so funny and piercing; they travel across global digital networks without subtitles and translation.

They are dangerous on multiple levels, firstly, to a US whose leadership has no sense of humor and is vulnerable to Grand Guignol as child鈥檚 play.

But also, the videos erode the resistance of the democratic world to propaganda that is masking understanding of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Iran鈥檚 ayatollah-led government as extraordinarily violent to many of Iran鈥檚 citizens.

SUPERPOWER TURGIDITY
For the first time since 2003, America has three aircraft carriers in the Gulf. The carriers guarantee the deadlock at the Gulf of Hormuz; but this impasse also traps the US in an unresolved war.

While the US is thus trapped, the superpower is obliged to face its depleted military stockpile and its inability to replace it fast. More importantly, under Trump, the US鈥� technological might 鈥� including the digital technology superiority that is also declining 鈥� has not contributed anything imaginative to US prospects.

It seems impossible now for either the US or Russia to liberate cultural forces to find a way out of the quagmires its leaders stuck them in.

There is something turgid about superpower impunity. Trump鈥檚 completely transparent indifference to the difficulties he has visited on Americans, including his MAGA constituency, forecloses inventiveness.

Putin鈥檚 stomach for sending Russians to their deaths in Ukraine will not foster imaginative agility.

Putin鈥檚 attempted conquest of Ukraine, or parts of it, has now taken longer than the Russian fight against the Nazis in World War 2, the victory over which is celebrated on Victory Day. Trump鈥檚 bungling attempted decapitation of the Iranian leadership has worked to entrench the theocratic-militarized prior status quo.

Without in any way drawing similarities between Iran and the Ukraine, except underdog status at present, the agile ways these two countries have shamed a hegemon deserve attention.

Specifically, attention to design 鈥� the term used broadly to include inventiveness powered by both skill and sharp reading of the cultural possibilities in technological developments 鈥� is attention to political and military outcomes.

*Read Part 1 here: https://tinyurl.com/239cgjtr

Marian Pastor Roces is an independent curator and critic of institutions. Her body of work addresses the intersection of culture and politics.

Baguio鈥檚 experience with students vaping on campus can be seen all across the country, according to teachers, parents, local government workers, and law enforcement agencies.

This is no surprise, given that the tobacco and vape industry has been aggressively marketing its products to the youth through vape ads disguised as 鈥渓ifestyle content鈥� on short form video platforms like TikTok 鈥� through dance trends, taste tests, flavor reviews, showing off new packaging designs, and vape giveaways.

Simultaneously, the industry has also been positioning vaping as a 鈥渉ealthy and safe alternative鈥� to smoking, arguing that all Filipinos should have freedom of choice and applying this argument to smokers having the choice of quitting through 鈥渉arm reduction鈥� or through switching to vapes or HTPs.

Harm reduction is the same argument the industry uses to argue that vapes should be taxed lower than cigarettes, as seen in the explanatory notes of House Bills 5207, 5212 and 5364 filed in the 20^th Congress by Reps. Kristine Singson-Meehan, Rufus and Maximo Rodriguez, and Ferdinand Hernandez, along with other legislators, mostly concentrated in Northern Luzon, the country鈥檚 largest tobacco-growing region.

Our children being pulled into addiction by aggressive ads while the industry talks about vaping as 鈥渇reedom鈥� paints an ironic picture 鈥� especially when considering the fact that vaping is so heavily marketed to young non-smokers, people who never needed 鈥渉arm reduction鈥� or 鈥渟afer alternatives鈥� to cigarette smoking in the first place (an argument that does not hold water, since the evidence is clear: vaping is not safe).

The industry, while touting claims of harm reduction and vaping as a smoking cessation tool for reduced risk, has never applied to register e-cigarettes as cessation tools in the first place. This is because their main market is one that is pulled into nicotine addiction early on in life and remain addicted for a prolonged period 鈥� the teenagers with colorful vapes hanging around their necks and attending parties and activations for free pods.

With the way they鈥檙e being marketed, it is also only a matter of time before newer nicotine products, like nicotine pouches (Zyn, for example) become more popular among the youth.

Their even more discreet nature compared to vapes (nicotine pouches are placed in between the teeth and the gums) make them even easier to use, and they are very loosely regulated, taxed at an extremely low P3/kg. Nicotine pouches are also flavored the way vapes are, and could very well be the next 鈥渉arm initiation鈥� 鈥� not 鈥渉arm reduction鈥� 鈥� tool getting kids hooked on nicotine.

The end of May is marked by World No Tobacco Day, a global celebration that this year will emphasize the industry tactics to 鈥渆ngineer addiction鈥� among the youth. Policy discussions surrounding vaping have been heated in recent months, with the Senate Health Committee considering bills to reverse the deregulatory provisions found in Republic Act 11900 (raising the age of access, banning flavors, and returning the jurisdiction of regulation to the Food and Drug Administration from the Department of Trade and Industry) and ban vaping in schools.

The Department of Health (DoH) and health advocates have been steadfast in their call for the Philippines to join our Southeast Asian neighbors in enacting a total ban on vapes.

While stronger regulation is being discussed, advocates are also awaiting the continuation of the House Ways and Means discussions on vape taxes chaired by Representative Miro Quimbo. Although the industry will likely push for a tax reduction in the name of 鈥渇airness鈥� and 鈥渉arm reduction,鈥� the data from the 2023 National Nutrition Survey speaks for itself: in just two years from 2021-2023, there was a 1,100% increase in 10- to 19-year-olds using e-cigarettes and HTPs, from 37,513 to 439,407. We clearly cannot afford to be complacent. We need to tax these products at the highest rate to keep young people from gaining access to highly addictive nicotine products.

Our legislators owe our youth a nicotine-free future 鈥� and this can only be achieved if we pay serious attention to the industry鈥檚 deception and stop letting them get away with their manipulative tactics.

Pia Rodrigo is AER鈥檚 strategic communication officer.

Metro Manila commuters spend an average of 120 to 145 hours a year stuck in traffic, equivalent to losing nearly an entire workweek annually while sitting on the road. Beyond lost time and productivity, prolonged exposure to traffic congestion can silently affect cardiovascular and respiratory health.

A 2017 study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) estimated that traffic congestion in Metro Manila costs the Philippine economy at least P3.5 billion daily. Without major interventions, these losses could rise to P5.4 billion per day by 2035.

Yet the impact of traffic extends beyond economics. Scientific evidence increasingly links traffic-related air pollution, chronic noise exposure, stress, and sedentary behavior to elevated risks of cardiovascular and lung disease.

A meta-analysis published in the Journal of Urban Health found that long-term exposure to traffic noise is associated with higher rates of cardiovascular disease, including ischemic heart disease, heart failure, and stroke. Another review published in Circulation Research, the official journal of the American Heart Association, showed that chronic exposure to traffic noise activates stress pathways that raise blood pressure and heart rate, accelerating cardiovascular damage over time.

Similarly, the UK Biobank Study involving over 500,000 participants found that residential road traffic noise was associated with elevated blood pressure, inflammation markers, and self-reported hypertension 鈥� all established cardiovascular risk factors. Published in the European Heart Journal, the study reinforces growing evidence that traffic-related stressors can have long-term health consequences.

A cohort study by Italian researchers published in the International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health further revealed that combined exposure to vehicular traffic noise and air pollution significantly increased cardiovascular disease risk even after accounting for socioeconomic factors such as age, education, and income.

These findings are consistent with local studies conducted in the Philippines. Research involving Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcers found that cumulative exposure to black carbon 鈥� a pollutant strongly associated with vehicular emissions 鈥� was linked to higher blood pressure levels. The study, conducted by researchers from the University of the Philippines-Manila, University of Santo Tomas, St. Luke鈥檚 College of Medicine-William H. Quasha Memorial, and the Professional Regulation Commission, was also published in the International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health.

The study noted that the effects were more pronounced among female traffic enforcers and individuals classified as 鈥渆ver smokers,鈥� suggesting that certain populations may be more vulnerable to the cardiovascular effects of traffic-related pollution. Researchers also found that inflammation triggered by black carbon and heavy metals may contribute to long-term heart damage.

The findings are particularly important because they provide one of the first localized datasets on occupational exposure to traffic-related pollutants in Metro Manila. They also underscore the need for stronger protective measures such as masks, health monitoring, and work rotation schedules for traffic enforcers and other highly exposed workers.

Traffic-related pollutants likewise pose serious risks to respiratory health. A study by researchers from the Ateneo School of Medicine and Public Health found that long-term exposure to fine particulate matter was associated with increased risk of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) among MMDA traffic enforcers.

As the country observes Road Safety Month, it is important to remember that protecting road users also means protecting them from the hidden health risks associated with traffic congestion.

Several practical measures can help reduce exposure to traffic-related stressors such as air pollution, noise, and psychological strain. During heavy traffic, keeping car windows closed and using air-conditioning on recirculation mode may help limit the intake of exhaust fumes. Carpooling or ridesharing can also help reduce the number of vehicles on the road and lower collective exposure to pollution.

When using public transportation, wearing a properly fitted KN95 or N95 mask can help protect against particulate pollution and airborne infectious diseases. Listening to calming music and practicing stress-management techniques such as deep breathing or mindfulness exercises during commutes may also help regulate blood pressure and reduce stress.

Maintaining a healthy lifestyle can further help buffer the negative effects of traffic-related stressors. Regular physical activity, a balanced diet, adequate sleep, moderation in alcohol consumption, and avoiding smoking can strengthen cardiovascular and respiratory resilience.

Vaccination also plays an important role in protecting vulnerable individuals. Respiratory infections such as influenza and pneumococcal disease can worsen cardiovascular conditions and increase the risk of serious complications. Flu and pneumococcal vaccination can help reduce illness severity, prevent complications, and protect vulnerable populations.

Addressing traffic congestion ultimately requires long-term investments in transportation systems, urban planning, and environmental protection. But while broader solutions are being pursued, individuals can still take meaningful steps to protect themselves from the hidden health costs of life on congested roads.

Teodoro B. Padilla is the executive director of Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines, which represents the biopharmaceutical medicines and vaccines industry in the country. Its members are at the forefront of developing, investing and delivering innovative medicines, vaccines, and diagnostics for Filipinos to live healthier and more productive lives.

WE LIVE in a time where advertisements hardly look like advertisements at all.

I remember growing up when television commercials stuck around longer than expected. Take Kris Aquino鈥檚 鈥渞ub-ada-bango,鈥� that song played on repeat inside my head for ages.

Even jingles from health advertisements stuck around like old nursery rhymes. The Department of Health鈥檚 jingles on family planning and TB DOTS became part of childhood memories for many Filipinos. Long before we fully grasped what the messages meant, we were already singing along to them with friends. Years later, we still remember that family planning matters and TB is treatable.

Advertising is powerful, it has the power to shift behavior.

This is why many countries began shutting down cigarette advertisements: not just to stop direct marketing, but also indirect selling like sponsored events and merchandise with brand logos. Public health experts understood decades ago that exposure to tobacco ads leads to normalization, especially among young people who are still easy to influence.

In recent times, as the tobacco industry diversified its deadly products, it also adapted its marketing for digital spaces. Today, marketing is harder to spot and regulate, bleeding through influencer content, gaming livestreams, and even cross-border. A Filipino youth can be influenced by a content creator living a continent away. For vapes and other nicotine products, promotion is no longer limited to obvious ads. It appears as lifestyle content, product reviews, unboxing videos, discount codes, affiliate links, livestream selling, hashtags, and casual influencer posts.

Young people carry billboards in their pockets, and a generation being raised by algorithms cannot simply out scroll nicotine marketing. I did not fully understand how powerful such exposure is until I came close to purchasing a vape.

Smoking was off-limits in our home. People close to me know that smoking is my non-negotiable.

Starting senior high school in Iloilo City, then later working there reinforced that mindset. The city鈥檚 consistent enforcement of smoke-free policies shaped what felt socially acceptable. I saw staff calling out anyone who would smoke or vape inside restaurants and cafes. Establishments actually complied with the law. Smoking still existed unfortunately, but it was socially undesirable.

That environment mattered more than I realized.

One ordinary day, I walked into a convenience store and saw a vape displayed near the counter. The price caught me off guard: P200 (~$4). I had assumed these electronic smoking devices (ESDs) were expensive and inaccessible.

At the time, I was under significant stress and found myself thinking about the flavors, the absence of cigarette smell, and how easy it would be to try it 鈥渏ust once.鈥� Even the bright yellow packaging felt intentionally appealing.

Afterwards, what was unsettling to me was how quickly I considered vaping after just seeing an e-cigarette. I walked away only because I heard my mother鈥檚 voice in my head reminding me that whatever happened in life, I should never smoke.

If a single exposure to a product in a convenience store could make me consider vaping, what happens to young people who encounter nicotine-related content constantly?

Filipinos are the top users of the internet, with young users driving this high usage. Most young people check social media several times a day, and are increasingly exposed to nicotine products appearing as lifestyle content instead of advertising. This exposure is not harmless at all; repeated exposure to nicotine-related content online leads to a significant increase in likelihood of tobacco and vape initiation.

Studies show that youth with no prior tobacco use, who use social media daily, are more likely to begin using tobacco products approximately a year later compared to less frequent social media users. Adolescents exposed weekly to nicotine-related content on TikTok are more likely to start using e-cigarettes. Youth with no prior tobacco use who are liking or following tobacco brand accounts also have a higher risk for any tobacco initiation and for starting to use multiple products.

This happens by design. These deadly companies know that awareness is the first step of every marketing funnel. But unlike most consumer products, the industry鈥檚 funnel does not end in a simple purchase. It ends in addiction.

Tobacco is unlike any other consumer product. It kills up to two-thirds of its users when consumed exactly as intended. This deadly industry will only survive by recruiting new users, and those are young people they can easily reach online without worrying about the laws.

The Philippines鈥� current approach to tobacco advertising is outdated. Restrictions are fragmented and filled with loopholes that the tobacco and nicotine industry continue to exploit. Republic Act No. 11900, which lowered the minimum age for access to vape products from 21 to 18 and reopened the market to flavors attractive to youth, allows online advertising and sales of e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products.

Partial restrictions have no chance to catch up to algorithmic advertising systems designed to maximize engagement.

With the rise of AI-generated content, influencer marketing, and subtle product placements, the line between content and advertisement gets blurry faster than regulation. Even age-gating measures on social media platforms remain weak and easily bypassed.

We cannot expect young people to 鈥渃hoose freely鈥� in a marketplace deliberately designed to catch their attention and shape their behavior. Protecting young people cannot rely solely on telling us to 鈥渕ake better choices.鈥� Prevention must also involve reducing, if not completely eliminating, the constant visibility and normalization of nicotine products.

With only a partial ban on tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship (TAPS), we are playing a catch-up game we cannot win against a cunning industry.

The Philippines, as a Party to the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), should align itself with global public health standards. Article 13 of the WHO FCTC requires Parties to implement a comprehensive ban on all forms of TAPS, including cross-border and digital marketing. This includes:

鈥� Eliminating point-of-sale displays to ensure no one is exposed to tobacco and nicotine products in stores.

鈥� Strengthening safety measures and enforcement on social media and e-commerce platforms.

鈥� Penalizing influencers, celebrities, and the tobacco industry for promoting nicotine use, whether direct or indirect.

鈥� Preventing legal loopholes and ensuring strong enforcement of the laws.

Preventing youth addiction begins long before the first puff, often with whether young people see the product at all.

Sources:

Australia, T. I. (2025, March 12). Greenhalgh, EM|Scollo, MM|Winstanley, MH.

Freeman, B., Watts, C., & Astuti, P. A. S. (2022). 鈥淕lobal tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship regulation: What鈥檚 old, what鈥檚 new and where to next?,鈥� Tobacco Control, 31(2), 221鈥�227.

Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control. (2024, May). Global Youth Voices Declaration.

Howe, S. (2026, March 30). 鈥淪ocial media statistics in the Philippines鈥� [Updated 2026]. Meltwater.

Pokhrel, P., Fagan, P., Herzog, T. A., Laestadius, L., Buente, W., Kawamoto, C. T., Lee, H.-R., & Unger, J. B. (2018). 鈥淪ocial media e-cigarette exposure and e-cigarette expectancies and use among young adults.鈥� Addictive Behaviors, 78, 51鈥�58.

Ranker, L. R., Wu, J., Hong, T., Wijaya, D., Benjamin, E. J., Bhatnagar, A., Robertson, R. M., Fetterman, J. L., & Xuan, Z. (2024). Social media use, brand engagement, and tobacco product initiation among youth: Evidence from a prospective cohort study. Addictive Behaviors, 154, 108000.

Vassey, J., Galimov, A., Kennedy, C. J., Vogel, E. A., & Unger, J. B. (2022). Frequency of social media use and exposure to tobacco or nicotine-related content in association with e-cigarette use among youth: A cross-sectional and longitudinal survey analysis. Preventive Medicine Reports, 30, 102055. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii

You are with two climbers are crossing a glacier. One slips into a crevasse. You could call for help, but you choose not to, and he dies. You also deliberately push the second climber into the ravine.

Which act is morally worse: fatal inaction or direct action?

Dobelli鈥檚 point was that human beings often judge omissions less harshly than deliberate acts, even when the consequences are equally grave. Psychologists call this omission bias, the tendency to believe that doing nothing is somehow cleaner, safer, and, yes, morally neutral.

INSTITUTIONS VULNERABLE TO OMISSION BIAS
But institutions are also vulnerable to omission bias.

And today, the Philippine Senate stands at precisely that crossroads.

The impeachment case against Sara Duterte is no longer simply a legal or procedural issue. It has evolved into a test of constitutional fidelity, institutional courage, and the future direction of Philippine democracy heading toward 2028.

The House of Representatives has already acted. By an overwhelming vote, lawmakers approved the articles of impeachment after concluding that there was probable cause to proceed on allegations involving misuse of confidential funds; discrepancies in her Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN); unexplained wealth; alleged corruption in the Department of Education during her tenure as secretary; and threats against the President, the First Lady, and former Speaker Martin Romualdez.

The Constitution is clear enough. Under Article XI, Section 3, the Senate possesses the sole power to try and decide impeachment cases.

WHAT THE SENATE OUGHT TO DO
The Senate is not being asked to prejudge the Vice-President.

It is being asked to perform its constitutional role.

That distinction is critical because a functioning impeachment process is not proof of guilt. It is the mechanism through which truth is tested in full public view. The Vice-President would retain every constitutional protection available to her: the right to counsel, the right to challenge evidence, the right to present witnesses, and the right to defend her name before the Filipino people.

Indeed, if she is innocent of the accusations, the impeachment trial could paradoxically become the most powerful political platform of her career.

That possibility is often ignored by both her supporters and critics.

POLITICAL PERSECUTION AND POLITICAL CAPITAL
If the proceedings unfold daily before national television, livestreams, and social media audiences, and if the Vice-President effectively dismantles the accusations against her, she could emerge politically stronger than before. A public acquittal after months of scrutiny would allow her to argue that she survived the full force of the political establishment and prevailed.

In Philippine politics, persecution narratives often generate political capital.

Her base in Mindanao would likely solidify further. Sympathy votes could expand into the Visayas. Even parts of Luzon, traditionally more skeptical of Duterte politics, might begin viewing her as a victim of elite political warfare rather than as an accused public official.

In that scenario, the impeachment trial becomes not a liability but a national stage. Every hearing becomes free political airtime. Every attack against her becomes an opportunity to project resilience, toughness, and victimhood, traits that have historically resonated with substantial segments of the electorate.

AT STAKE: 2028 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
A successful defense in the Senate could therefore transform the 2028 presidential race.

It could revive the Duterte political machine at the precise moment many believed it was weakening.

But the opposite outcome is equally possible.

If the House evidence proves substantial and coherent, and if witnesses withstand scrutiny under oath, the impeachment proceedings could become politically devastating. Unlike ordinary political attacks, impeachment hearings institutionalize scrutiny. Documents are examined publicly. Financial trails are dissected. Contradictions become part of the permanent public record.

The danger for the Vice-President is not merely legal exposure. It is sustained political erosion.

Presidential elections in the Philippines are often won not only through popularity but through the preservation of political inevitability. Once the perception of invincibility weakens, alliances begin to shift. Local political clans reassess loyalties. Business groups diversify their money bets. Even supporters begin searching quietly for alternatives.

ALTERNATIVES TO SARA EMERGING
And the alternatives are already emerging.

Leni Robredo remains a potent moral and political figure despite her 2022 defeat. Her leadership style continues to attract sectors searching for governance grounded in transparency, competence, and institutional reform. Meanwhile, Raffy Tulfo maintains considerable mass appeal rooted in populist credibility and anti-establishment branding.

If Senator Tulfo ultimately declines a presidential bid, and if democratic and reform-oriented forces consolidate behind Robredo or another consensus candidate, the political equation changes dramatically.

The Duterte mystique, long built on perceptions of unstoppable political dominance, could begin to appear less permanent and more conditional.

That is why the impeachment trial matters far beyond the immediate charges.

It is also an early battle over the shape of the 2028 elections.

The Senate therefore faces not merely a judicial responsibility but a historic institutional moment. Will it allow constitutional accountability to proceed openly? Or will it attempt to neutralize the process through procedural delay, technical maneuvering, or institutional hesitation?

THE DANGER OF OMISSION BIAS
This is where omission bias becomes dangerous.

Many senators may persuade themselves that avoiding confrontation preserves stability. Some may argue that impeachment is too divisive. Others may claim that economic legislation, inflation, or national security concerns deserve greater urgency.

But constitutional accountability is not a distraction from governance.

It is part of governance.

No democratic institution can sustainably claim to prioritize reform while simultaneously evading one of the Constitution鈥檚 clearest accountability mechanisms.

The Senate should realize that its actions last year had already generated widespread criticism. After initially delaying proceedings during congressional recess, the impeachment complaint was later remanded to the House to clarify issues surrounding the constitutional one-year bar and continuity between Congresses.

To supporters of the Vice-President, these were prudent legal precautions.

To critics, they looked like institutional avoidance, a way of preserving plausible deniability while quietly preventing momentum from building toward a full trial.

TIMING INTENSIFIES PUBLIC SUSPICION
Such timing intensified public suspicion.

The reappearance of Ronald 鈥淏ato鈥� dela Rosa at the center of Senate developments added another layer of controversy, especially amid continuing discussions surrounding possible accountability mechanisms linked to the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations into the Duterte administration鈥檚 anti-drug campaign.

Outside the Senate building, civil society organizations, church groups, activists, students, and various multisectoral coalitions converged to pressure lawmakers into proceeding with the trial. Their slogans were sharp and unmistakable:

鈥淣o one is above the law.鈥�

鈥�Litisin si Sara, hulihin si 叠补迟辞.鈥�

鈥淣o to Senate as sanctuary for fugitives.鈥�

鈥淎ccountability over abuse of power.鈥�

These demonstrations reveal a deeper public anxiety: the fear that powerful political figures may once again escape accountability through institutional protection networks.

Supporters of the Duterte bloc, however, frame the issue differently. They argue that the impeachment process and ICC-related developments are manifestations of political persecution and foreign interference. They invoke nationalism and sovereignty, portraying external scrutiny as an assault on Philippine independence.

NO TO EVADING ACCOUNTABILITY
But sovereignty cannot be selectively invoked to evade accountability.

The ICC issue exists because the Philippines remained a member of the court during the period when the alleged crimes against humanity were committed. International cooperation, including coordination through Interpol or mutual legal assistance frameworks, is not automatically a surrender of sovereignty. It is part of the obligations states voluntarily assume under international law.

The Senate, of all institutions, should understand this distinction clearly.

At stake therefore is more than the future of one political family.

At stake is the credibility of constitutional democracy itself in the Philippines.

IMPEACHMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
If the Senate proceeds with the impeachment trial, the country gains something valuable regardless of the outcome: transparency. Evidence will be tested publicly. Arguments will be heard openly. The Filipino people will see institutions functioning as designed.

If the Vice-President is acquitted after a fair trial, her legitimacy strengthens.

If she is convicted after due process, then accountability prevails.

But if the Senate effectively kills the impeachment through delay or procedural suffocation, the damage could extend far beyond 2028.

It would reinforce a dangerous national lesson: that accountability depends not on constitutional principles but on political arithmetic; that institutions bend differently for the powerful; and that public trust may once again be subordinated to elite alliances.

That erosion of trust is far more corrosive than any single impeachment battle.

Democracies rarely collapse overnight. More often, institutions slowly weaken because they repeatedly choose convenience over principle, silence over scrutiny, and omission over responsibility.

Which should go down to the ravine?

That is the real warning behind omission bias.

Doing nothing is not neutral.

Refusing to act is itself an act with consequences.

The Senate now has an opportunity to demonstrate that constitutional accountability in the Philippines remains alive, functional, and independent of political dynasties or partisan loyalties.

The Filipino people deserve more than spectacle. They deserve institutions willing to confront difficult truths under the rule of law, regardless of who stands accused.

If something must ultimately fall into the ravine, it should not be constitutional accountability.

It should be the culture of impunity that has long haunted Philippine politics.

Diwa C. Guinigundo is the former deputy governor for the Monetary and Economics Sector, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). He served the BSP for 41 years. In 2001-2003, he was alternate executive director at the International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC. He is the senior pastor of the Fullness of Christ International Ministries in Mandaluyong.

THERE IS GROWING recognition that forest carbon projects can play a meaningful role in climate mitigation and environmental protection in the Philippines. Despite this interest, however, many such projects struggle to move forward. The hesitation does not arise from opposition to environmental regulation, nor from a lack of technical capacity or financing. It stems from a more fundamental uncertainty: how should these projects be legally understood when they take place on public lands?

At present, forest carbon initiatives will probably be evaluated using legal frameworks designed for entirely different activities. It may be treated as leases of public domain land, subject to the familiar 25-year limitation renewable once. Or it may be assumed to fall within the constitutional regime governing the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources, thereby raising questions about nationality restrictions and control. These concerns appear cautious, even prudent, but they rest on a basic misalignment between the nature of the activity and the legal categories being applied.

In a previous 大象传媒 article, I discussed how carbon benefits within ancestral domains may be understood as fruits of Indigenous ownership, grounded in the recognition of pre-existing property rights under the Indigenous Peoples鈥� Rights Act. This discussion turns to a different setting: public forest lands, where ownership remains with the State under the Regalian doctrine. In this context, the legal character of carbon projects is necessarily different. What is involved is not the enjoyment of property, but the performance of a regulated environmental service under continuing State authority.

The difficulty arises because our legal system has long been structured around extractive relationships. Timber licenses, mining permits, and land leases all derive value from the use, consumption, or depletion of resources. In these arrangements, the State transfers some degree of control or enjoyment over land or resources to a private party in exchange for economic return. These are relationships of appropriation, built on the assumption that value is created by taking something from the land and converting it into a marketable product.

Forest carbon projects do not fit within this model. They generate value not by extracting from the land, but by preserving it. Their success depends on restoring degraded areas and ensuring long-term ecological stability. The project proponent does not earn from what is taken out of the land, but from what is demonstrably kept intact and verified through a regulatory process. The governing logic is restraint, not exploitation.

Under civil law, a lease requires the transfer of use and enjoyment. The lessee benefits from the property and derives utility from its productive capacity. In a forest carbon project, the proponent is not allowed to do any of these. There is no right to harvest timber, no authority to convert land use, and no entitlement to extract economic value in the traditional sense. The forest remains under State control, subject to regulatory supervision and strict conditions of protection. The proponent鈥檚 presence on the land is instrumental, limited to what is necessary to perform the authorized activity, and the land itself is merely the site of the service, not the object of a right being transferred.

To characterize this arrangement as a lease is therefore to confuse the location of an activity with its legal nature. It is similar to applying leasing arrangement to a contractor hired to maintain or secure a public facility. The contractor may enter the premises and perform defined tasks, but does not 鈥渆njoy鈥� the property in the legal sense contemplated by a lease. What is involved is an obligation to perform, not a right to possess, and once this distinction is appreciated, the concern over lease limitations begins to fall away.

A parallel misunderstanding arises in the treatment of carbon credits. They are often described as if they were part of the forest, akin to timber or other natural products. This intuition is misleading. Carbon credits do not exist as physical objects found in nature. They come into existence only after a process of measurement, verification, and certification conducted under a regulatory framework. Without that process, there is no carbon credit to speak of in any legal sense.

In legal terms, carbon credits are best understood as regulatory instruments. They are created to recognize a verified environmental outcome, specifically the reduction or removal of greenhouse gas emissions. Their existence and value depend entirely on compliance with prescribed methodologies and issuance through an authorized registry. They function in the same analytical space as emissions allowances or renewable energy certificates, units generated through regulatory systems rather than extracted from the environment.

Once carbon credits are properly understood in this way, the constitutional framework becomes clearer. The Constitution regulates the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources, a regime directed at activities involving extraction, depletion, or appropriation of physical assets of the public domain. Forest carbon projects do not fall within this category. They do not diminish the State鈥檚 patrimony. On the contrary, they reinforce it by ensuring the continued existence and ecological function of forests. Properly viewed, they align with the State鈥檚 obligation under the Constitution to protect the environment and promote a balanced and healthful ecology.

This understanding also addresses concerns regarding foreign participation. In forest carbon projects on public lands, foreign entities do not acquire ownership of land, do not obtain rights over timber or other forest resources, and do not exercise control over the resource base. Their role is typically limited to financing, technical development, project implementation, or the acquisition of carbon credits once issued. Their economic interest lies in a regulatory entitlement, not in the land or natural resources themselves.

The constitutional restriction under Article XII of the Constitution is directed at foreign ownership or control of natural resources. It does not extend to participation in regulatory systems designed to conserve them. To apply nationality limitations to forest carbon projects would be to treat environmental compliance mechanisms as though they were forms of resource exploitation, a conclusion that does not follow from constitutional text.

What emerges from this analysis is not a constitutional barrier, but an institutional gap. Our regulatory tools have not fully adjusted to the emergence of non-extractive environmental services. We continue to rely on concepts developed for land disposition and resource extraction to govern activities that depend on preservation and long-term stewardship. The result is uncertainty, which in turn discourages investment and slows the development of projects that could otherwise contribute to national climate goals.

The way forward does not require new constitutional interpretation. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources already possesses the authority to regulate activities within public forest lands, not only as an administrator of natural resources, but also as a guardian of environmental quality. This dual mandate allows the State to move beyond purely extractive models and to recognize activities that generate value through conservation. Forest carbon projects should therefore be structured as environmental service arrangements authorized through administrative mechanisms, rather than as leases or concessions. Such authorization would allow project proponents to access land for defined purposes without transferring possession or beneficial enjoyment. It would make clear that all rights over land and natural resources remain with the State, while recognizing the role of private actors in delivering measurable environmental outcomes.

This approach preserves the integrity of constitutional principles while enabling practical governance. It maintains State ownership and control over public lands, avoids any implication of resource exploitation, and provides a stable framework within which long-term carbon projects can operate. Most importantly, it aligns legal doctrine with the actual nature of the activity being regulated.

If forest carbon projects are properly classified, the perceived legal obstacles largely fall away. The Constitution does not stand in the way of these initiatives. What is required is a clearer understanding of what they are and what they are not. In a legal system built on careful distinctions, getting the classification right is not a matter of semantics, but the difference between enabling a new class of environmental solutions and constraining them through the continued use of outdated categories.

Atty. Erwin L. Tiamson leads the Indigenous Peoples Property Rights Project of the Foundation for Economic Freedom. He teaches Property and Land Laws at the UP Geodetic Engineering Department and Arellano Law School, and is a policy consultant specializing in land rights, environmental law, and institutional design.

The definition of nihilism in the dictionary that I use provides two senses applicable to this philosophical view. One sense is 鈥渁 viewpoint that traditional values and beliefs are unfounded and that existence is senseless and useless.鈥� The other sense is 鈥渁 doctrine or belief that conditions in the social organization are so bad as to make destruction desirable for its own sake independent of any constructive program or possibility.鈥� For purposes of this commentary, I translated those definitions into a question: 鈥淚s life worth living?鈥� I have not studied in any detail the existing literature about the philosophy behind nihilism. I will be expressing my own observations, perceptions, thoughts, and knowledge relating to this philosophical view.

After a human is born, he is cared for by his parents or others for some length of time. He undergoes a process that prepares him for the time that he can take care of himself alone. All these efforts incur significant parental or guardian time and costs. In his adult lifetime, he experiences, in alternating times, hardships, injuries, defeats, and physical, emotional, and mental pain; complete happiness, jubilation, joy, and triumphs; and other similar conditions and emotions. These may arise from his own decisions and actions, or from the effects of the ever-changing developments in the world and in the particular geographical area where he lives. Each of these episodes is not permanent. Each of them occurs every now and then for a relatively short period of time within a person鈥檚 lifetime. The net balance, whether each occurrence or condition is valued similarly or differently, is, of course, either a net good life or a net bad life. Whether it is one or the other may not matter, though.

Eventually, the final day comes when he dies. So, what happens next? One point of view is that he turns into complete nothingness, without any distinctive trace, and therefore no form of his old self remains that can recollect and enjoy in recollection the best parts of his life on Earth. Existence is completely gone. Absolutely blank. All the time he spent on Earth becomes purposeless. All his sufferings, hardships, pains, struggles, sorrows, trials and tribulations appear senseless.

So, what is the point of living then? Before anyone cries out calling me names, I would like to add that I know that the great majority of us believe in the afterlife. But where does this afterlife dwell? A popular portrayal of where the afterlife dwells is provided by the Italian author Dante Alighieri in his three books 鈥� Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso 鈥� published in the early 14^th century and collectively known as the Divine Comedy. We are all familiar with these portrayed afterlife destinations, and there is no need for me to further elaborate on them. Except that, to provide a few examples, I thought I should find out the potential destination, based on Dante鈥檚 descriptions, of our corrupt leaders who contribute in great measure to the sufferings of the Filipino people. Being major sinners, they will go to Inferno. But at which part in Inferno they are destined to go to will depend upon how their sins are classified.

There are two possible fits. One is to consider these corrupt government leaders as avaricious (excessively acquisitive), and, as such, they are destined to go to the Fifth Circle in Inferno. In this Circle, the punishment is for each of them to push forward by his chest a large rolling stone. Upon reaching an established point, he turns around and, by using his back, pushes the same stone backwards. He then repeats this process on and on, forever. There is another possible fit 鈥� to consider these corrupt government officials as thieves. If so, they go to the Eighth Circle, which is divided into sections for similar sins, each called a Bolgia. Their destined place in the Eighth Circle is the Seventh Bolgia, where the body of each of them is coiled with serpents. These serpents keep on moving around his body, which makes him try to push back by holding on to the head or tail of the serpent. Whether the best fit for these said leaders is being avaricious persons or thieves, their due punishment appears to be just.

(As a point of interest, the First Circle in Inferno, where torments and lamentations do not take place, is where the well-known personalities who lived before the coming of Jesus Christ dwell, such as Homer, Socrates, Abraham, Noah, and similar others. These dwellers also include well-known non-Christian philosophers who lived after the advent of Jesus Christ, such as Avicenna and Averroes, both of whom were Muslims. The term 鈥淔irst Circle鈥� was used by the Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn as the title of his famous book, no doubt because the book is about a Russian prison camp where the high-skilled prisoners are incarcerated.)

For those believing in the afterlife, the choice destination is, of course, Paradiso. But how those who deserve to go to Paradiso are selected is not known to us. However, if the model for those who deserve to go to Paradiso is Mother Theresa, then the probability for the rest of us going somewhere else is exceedingly high, and we are therefore destined to suffer forever.

In both cases, then, whether there is or is not an afterlife, the prospect of what becomes of us after death is very discouraging indeed. In the first case, if there is no afterlife, we start from nothing and end up to nothing, which makes the trip from birth to death purposeless and without any meaning. In the second case, if there is an afterlife, there is a little chance that we go to Paradiso. But it will be a huge struggle. And if we fail, our afterlife will see us suffer forever. However, there is something else to think about, though.

While life on Earth is finite, we have been given the ability to procreate. There is a part of us that gets transferred to our descendants, although to a diminishing degree. This transfer appears to show as if we continue to live. Moreover, we leave a remembrance of ourselves among those who come after us. Of course, such remembrance would be either beneficial or hurtful to those we leave behind, depending upon how we lead our lives on this Earth. In any event, these truths may matter, whether or not there is an afterlife.

Is life worth living then? You judge.

Benjamin R. Punongbayan is the founder of Punongbayan & Araullo.

ben.punongbayan@ph.gt.com

AS THE WORLD confronts the challenges of population aging and healthcare workforce shortages, digital transformation in healthcare is no longer optional but essential. Taiwan has introduced the 鈥淗ealthy Taiwan鈥� vision, placing 鈥渄riving digital healthcare鈥� at its core. By integrating big data, artificial intelligence (AI), and cloud technologies, the system aims to improve healthcare quality and efficiency while moving toward a new healthcare model centered on holistic, person-centered care.

Taiwan benefits from both a robust information and communications technology industry and the foundation of its National Health Insurance (NHI) system, which has accumulated high-quality healthcare data over time and laid a critical foundation for smart healthcare development. Building on this, we have introduced a national digital health platform known as the 鈥�3-3-3 Framework,鈥� integrating three major health spaces, three key health data standards, and three National AI governance centers to establish a comprehensive digital health infrastructure. Under this framework, we are promoting the integration of electronic medical records across more than 400 hospitals nationwide and adopting international standards such as Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) to ensure cross-institutional interoperability. Within a Zero Trust cybersecurity framework, healthcare data can be securely shared and effectively utilized.

With these policies in place, tangible results are already beginning to emerge. In chronic disease management, the 鈥淔amily Physician Platform鈥� incorporates AI-based risk prediction to support physicians in delivering personalized care, facilitating a shift from reactive treatment to proactive health management. In terms of healthcare data integration, the MediCloud system provides real-time access to patient records and medication information, while enhanced visualization of examination results and AI-assisted medical imaging interpretation further improve healthcare quality and patient safety.

Personal health management has also been strengthened. The 鈥淢y Health Bank鈥� platform has surpassed a 50% adoption rate and can be integrated with data from wearable devices, encouraging individuals to take a more active role in managing their health. In digitalization of cancer treatment, Taiwan utilizes the FHIR standard to exchange Next-Generation Sequencing (NGS) data, accelerating the review process for catastrophic illness certification and related medical use, thereby improving access to timely treatment. In addition, the promotion of virtual health insurance cards, e-prescriptions, and telemedicine services is effectively overcoming temporal and geographical barriers, expanding access to rural and home-based care.

Taiwan has established a comprehensive governance framework to advance the development of clinical AI. Nineteen national medical AI centers have been established, covering responsible governance, clinical validation, and impact evaluation, ensuring that AI is safe and reliable across the entire process from development to application. To date, more than 50 AI medical products have received regulatory approval, supporting early cancer detection, prediction of cardiac events, and clinical decision making support. Taiwan also has 13 hospitals ranked among Newsweek鈥檚 鈥淲orld鈥檚 Best Smart Hospitals 2026,鈥� placing second in Asia and demonstrating strong international competitiveness. In addition, Taiwan is advancing federated learning platforms that enable cross-institutional and cross-border AI model validation without transferring sensitive data, and has begun collaborating with partners in Southeast Asia to establish trusted international data-sharing models.

Diseases know no borders, and global health governance requires comprehensive collaboration. Taiwan has established a smart healthcare ecosystem driven by data, enabled by AI, and supported by interoperable standards, extending medical services from hospitals into communities and daily life and realizing holistic care. Taiwan鈥檚 practical experience demonstrates that we are capable of contributing to the international community.

However, Taiwan continues to be excluded from full participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) and its related mechanisms. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolution 25.1 neither mention Taiwan nor exclude Taiwan from participating in WHO and the WHA.

We sincerely urge WHO and relevant stakeholders to support Taiwan鈥檚 inclusion in the global health system, thereby strengthening its completeness and resilience. Taiwan will continue to advance smart healthcare through digital innovation and contribute to global health and well-being. Together, we can realize the vision of health as a fundamental human right as set forth in the WHO Constitution, as well as the commitment of the United Nations鈥� Sustainable Development Goals to leave no one behind.

Dr. Chung-Liang Shih is the minister of Health and Welfare of Taiwan.

There was a time not so long ago when anyone who suggested that a big population was a boon to leverage, rather than a burden to cut down to size, was met with raised eyebrows, rolling eyes, and a smirk, and was deemed as either living in the clouds or just plain bonkers.

To this day, we still meet folks who advocate aggressive population control 鈥� despite critical manpower shortages now facing the likes of China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore, arguing that we are nowhere near the inflection point that presaged a critical, sustained drop (near-flat growth in the case of natural-born Singaporeans) in those countries鈥� populations.

Not yet, but perhaps we have begun approaching such a point: the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) reported in November 2022 that the country鈥檚 total fertility rate (TFR) 鈥� a primary driver of population growth 鈥� fell below the pace deemed needed to sustain the current population (a threshold globally pegged at 2.1 children per woman 鈥� here in the Philippines aged 15-49 years covered by the triennial National Demographic and Health Survey, or NDHS) at 1.9 children per woman from 2.7 in 2017¹.

The situation, of course, varied across the archipelago, but this slowdown was more pronounced in urban areas (1.7 in 2002 from 2.4 in 2017) than in rural ones (2.2 from 2.9 in the same comparative years). Global convention pegs a 鈥渉igh fertility鈥� rate at above five children per woman and 鈥渧ery low fertility鈥� at below 1.3.²

A graph that came with that report showed a sustained, gradual TFR slowdown since at least 1993 (the NDHS began in 1968), except when it steadied at 3.0 in urban areas in the 1998 and 2003 surveys.

This downward trend picked up pace, placing TFR at 1.7 overall in 2025, consisting of 1.5 urban and 2.0 rural, according to the latest NDHS results 鈥� for 2025 鈥� which the PSA reported on March 30.³

TIED TO ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Implying that fertility rate is inversely related to education 鈥� TFR was highest among those with some primary education at 3.1 children per woman, and declined with higher educational attainment, as well as to wealth 鈥� the poorest quintile posted 2.8, while the richest recorded 1.1.

While the TFR鈥檚 relation with the national economy is not that apparent, this rate was inversely related to economic activity in specific areas.

Note, for instance, that TFR was found lowest in Calabarzon, which hosts the bulk of the country鈥檚 main industrial zones 鈥� 61 in that region under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority⁴ 鈥� at 1.3 children per woman, followed by Metro Manila at 1.4 (tied with the Negros Island Region, or NIR).

As of 2025, Metro Manila accounted for 31.2% of the national economy, followed by Calabarzon with 14.8%, with both making up close to half of the national economy at 46%. Add Central Luzon鈥檚 11.1% and those three regions contribute 57.1% to the national economy (if you鈥檙e interested, the newly established [in June 2024] NIR accounted for a measly 1.65%, the second-smallest regional economy)⁵. These proportions have roughly steadied across decades, since regional economic structures change very gradually, if ever at all.

Conversely, lower TFR seemed directly related to lower poverty incidence among families. As of 2021, Metro Manila recorded the lowest such reading at 2.2%, followed by the Cordillera Administrative Region鈥檚 (CAR) 6.9%, Calabarzon鈥檚 7.2%, and Central Luzon鈥檚 8.3%. As of 2023, Metro 听 Manila still had the lowest incidence at 1.1%, followed by CAR鈥檚 4.4%, Calabarzon鈥檚 5.3%, and Central Luzon鈥檚 5.7%.⁶

In comparison, TFR was found highest in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) at 2.4 children per woman, followed by the Zamboanga Peninsula鈥檚 2.3 and Caraga鈥檚 (northeastern Mindanao) 2.2.

The BARMM has long been the smallest regional economy, accounting for just 1.1% of the national economy, while the Zamboanga Peninsula made the eighth smallest contribution at 2.5% and Caraga the third-smallest at 1.7%.

In terms of poverty incidence, the BARMM had the worst reading of 28% in 2021, followed Caraga鈥檚 25.9% and Zamboanga Peninsula鈥檚 23.4%. BARMM still had the highest incidence at 23.5% in 2023, followed by Zamboanga Peninsula鈥檚 24.2% (while Caraga showed vast improvement to 14.9%).

The PSA has attributed these significant TFR changes to growing use of various family planning methods and changing attitudes and behavior (partly, perhaps, as wages stagnate and prices of widely used goods and services continue to rise, thus making it more and more difficult to make ends meet; as well as increased economic opportunities for those听 听 听 听 with higher skills and education that encourage them to build careers first before family.)

READY?
And we are not alone 鈥� more than two-thirds of the world鈥檚 inhabitants live in countries where fertility has dropped to below the replacement threshold, and the United Nations (UN) projects that global population will peak some time in the 2080s before starting a sustained decline.⁷

Religious beliefs and traditional practices have long been the whipping boy for perceived overpopulation (when the problem of inadequate resources lies more in inequitable distribution, flawed development program implementation, i.e., racked by inefficiencies, graft and corruption, etc.), even as predominantly Catholic countries like Mexico, Brazil, Paraguay, and the Philippines have recorded 鈥渄ramatic鈥� TFR declines since the 1960s 鈥渄espite the lack of any official support for 鈥榰nnatural鈥� methods of family planning over this period of time鈥�⁸. The Philippines, specifically, saw a population growth rate (which, again, is driven primarily by TFR) high of 4.1 in 1956 and 1957, as well as a sustained, if erratic, gradual decline since then to 0.8% in 2023⁹.

Slowing population growth may be music to Malthusian ears, but government and business planners had better start preparing for the inevitable contraction of the talent pool in decades to come. I wonder if the dropping TFR now figures in their scenario-building at all.

To be sure, some sectors have already begun feeling the pinch of a shallow bench 鈥� including healthcare, call centers, and, yes, even mainstream media, among many other industries 鈥� although this issue can be attributed to various factors, including Millennials鈥� and Zoomers鈥� changing job preferences and better pay abroad for highly skilled, experienced talent (both factors partly attributable to these youngsters鈥� greater global orientation and awareness, thanks to social media).

True, some foreign investors still regard our young, educated, English-proficient work force as a come-on (though not the biggest consideration per se, since we also have inadequate infrastructure, high electricity rates, plus an uncertain policy environment), but that advantage is increasingly applicable to much of Southeast Asia. Hence, this heretofore Philippine edge (we no longer have a cheap work force, by the way) is fast eroding.

Then there are the deep-seated challenges posed by our declining quality of education (not just for the sciences and mathematics, but also for humanities basics like history which provide crucial background context for national crises) and even English proficiency 鈥� worrisome trends that will weigh on the quality of our talent pool and which could negate any demographic dividend we still hope to ride on, hence, eroding our national competitiveness vs. our rivals for foreign investments.

So, add to all those considerations these recent signs of a slowing fertility rate, which has fallen below what is deemed needed to sustain the current population.

To be sure, we should be reaping some benefits from a falling TFR.

鈥淎s fertility declines, the proportion of children in the population falls, and the proportion of the population of working age increases, resulting in a lower dependency ratio,鈥� says the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, which defined that ratio as the number children and older persons per 100 persons of working age.

鈥淧rovided jobs are available for the increasing population of working age, a country can reap the benefits of increased production and lower costs associated with the decreasing proportion of dependents,鈥� it added.

鈥淭his 鈥榙emographic bonus鈥� can, thus, contribute significantly to economic growth and poverty reduction.鈥�

But this advantage erodes as fertility continues its decline over the long term, leading to a continuous decline in proportion of the working-age segment and a corresponding steady increase in the elderly.

(To be concluded on May 28.)

¹ https://tinyurl.com/23o2j6yc

²

³ https://tinyurl.com/295efzah

⁴ https://tinyurl.com/25vxd4bj

⁵ https://tinyurl.com/2d58jeny

⁶

⁷ https://tinyurl.com/29d73nxs

⁸ https://tinyurl.com/29jpp38q

⁹ https://tinyurl.com/29qs64gq

Wilfredo G. Reyes was editor-in-chief of 大象传媒 from 2020 through 2023.

Pax Silica links allied supply chains across critical minerals, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transport logistics, and Artificial Intelligence infrastructure. The Philippines formally joined that initiative in April as the 13^th country-signatory.

The case for joining is easy to understand. Finance Secretary Frederick Go said the Philippines would be ensuring that its mineral resources and strategic location would not just support 鈥済lobal industries from the margins but [would be] actively harnessed to build the industries of the future.鈥�

The geopolitical logic is also real. Pax Silica is meant to reduce dangerous concentration in strategic supply chains and build a trusted network for the industries that will define the next several decades. Offering Clark as a hub allows the Philippines to secure place in that network.

But before we celebrate, we need to ask two questions. The first is about water. The second is about law. Both must be answered before we move ahead in New Clark City, because both go to the viability of the project itself. Golden Node may be inevitable, but conditions need to be met.

On World Water Day 2026, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Juan Miguel Cuna warned that the Philippines faces 鈥渁 challenge of water bankruptcy,鈥� with water demand outpacing nature鈥檚 ability to replenish supply. That was not an activist slogan. That was the country鈥檚 environment secretary describing a national condition.

The warning becomes more serious when placed beside the geography of the Pax Silica project. The Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) reporting on water districts found that Central Luzon had the highest average water deficit in the country. PIDS also found that across the country鈥檚 water districts, annual demand exceeded effective supply, and that districts remained heavily dependent on groundwater.

That dependence is not a technical footnote. It is the heart of the problem. PIDS noted that groundwater extraction in the Philippines rose by an average of 3.8% a year from 2014 to 2023, and warned that over-dependence on aquifers raised the risks of saline intrusion, land subsidence, falling water tables, and long-term water-quality deterioration.

Scientific and technical studies have linked excessive groundwater extraction in Pampanga and Bulacan to land subsidence measured in centimeters per year. Satellite-based work has also found especially severe sinking in parts of Bulacan, including rates of about 11 centimeters per year. Research on the western Pampanga delta likewise tied groundwater-driven subsidence to worsening floods, tidal inundation, and saltwater intrusion inland.

Water source becomes a bigger issue in today鈥檚 economy. Just a mid-sized data center already uses around 1.4 million liters of water a day for cooling. Larger facilities can obviously use more, and the rise of AI-oriented infrastructure is pushing resource demands higher.

Semiconductor manufacturing is even more water-intensive. Policy and industry sources indicate that a large chip fabrication plant can use roughly 37 million to 38 million liters of water a day, much of it in the form of ultra-pure water. Some of that water can be recycled, but the withdrawal requirement remains massive, especially where the surrounding watershed is already stressed.

So this is the first contradiction. The region with the country鈥檚 highest reported water deficit is being positioned to host one of the country鈥檚 most water-intensive industrial bets. That is not a minor issue. If withdrawals are massive, and recycling is incomplete, then local water stress can worsen.

As for the second problem, official statements describe the 鈥淕olden Node鈥� site as an 鈥淓conomic Security Zone.鈥� But recent reporting, most notably from the Wall Street Journal, says the proposed arrangement is expected to involve administration under US common law and diplomatic-immunity-like protections.

Those claims are too important to leave in the realm of rumor, selective leaks, or strategic ambiguity. The public needs to know what is actually in the legal instrument, if any, creating the Golden Node because the constitutional implications are obvious.

The Constitution says judicial power is vested in Philippine courts. It also says a treaty or international agreement, like a military pact, is not valid and effective without Senate concurrence by at least two-thirds of all its members. Although, Golden Node is not a military base but an economic zone.

A commercial project can route private disputes into arbitration. Republic Act No. 9285 expressly institutionalizes alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and international commercial arbitration in the Philippines. So, any issues between private parties in the Golden Node can go to arbitration in Singapore or elsewhere.

But that only sharpens the real issue: arbitration can only govern private dispute resolution. Questions about public authority, constitutionality, jurisdiction, and sovereign power do not simply disappear because parties agreed to arbitrate. With the Golden Node, whose laws will apply?

That is why the distinction matters. Existing special economic zones remain inside Philippine legal space even when they enjoy tax, customs, and regulatory incentives. They do not suspend the Constitution. If what is being proposed for the Golden Node is a 鈥渓iberal鈥� investment and arbitration framework under Philippine law, then government should say so plainly. If it goes further than this, then government should say that plainly too, and explain the legal basis.

This is not a theoretical concern. The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) has already publicly tied the project to a two-year grace period on lease payments, treated as an unconditional in-kind contribution to support economic cooperation initiatives between the Philippines and the United States. Commitments have been made even as the legal architecture remains unclear to the public.

The Philippines has a genuine chance here to anchor itself in a strategic industrial corridor tied to semiconductors, critical minerals, AI infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing. That could strengthen exports, deepen industrial capability, and attract higher-value activity to New Clark City.

But any industrial strategy should not treat water as an afterthought. And no sovereign state should invite legal ambiguity into 1,600 hectares of strategic territory. The Golden Node is a big bet. But industrial ambition should not trump local laws and water security. We cannot drink silicon.

Marvin Tort is a former managing editor of 大象传媒, and a former chairman of the Philippine Press Council.

matort@yahoo.com

Today I have assembled a variety of economic and energy data from different sources for the three largest economies in Asia, North America, and Europe. In GDP size at current values, the US is No. 1 in the world, but at purchasing power parity (PPP) values, China is No. 1. And this is consistent with rankings in merchandise exports, total energy supply (TES), and total power generation (TPG).

In 2025, the total combined GDP size of the US, Canada, and Mexico was $36.98 trillion, smaller than China鈥檚 $41.24 trillion. When it comes to merchandise exports, the total combined exports of the US, Canada, and Mexico was $3.40 trillion, smaller than China鈥檚 $3.77 trillion.

In TES, the combined size of the three North America countries was 111.75 exajoules (EJ), smaller than China鈥檚 158.88 EJ. And in TPG, the combined size of the US, Canada, and Mexico was 5,627 terawatt-hours (TWh), smaller than China鈥檚 10,087 TWh (see Table 1).

These numbers show that China already eclipsed the US economy several years ago. But we keep hearing and reading in many news outlets and even academic papers that the US economy is larger than China鈥檚 so the US can throw its weight around in many negotiations on trade, investments, infrastructure, and energy.

It seems that China has patiently endured the 鈥淯S is more economically dominant鈥� narrative while consistently increasing its market share in global exports and energy supply. BYD and Geely cars, Howo trucks, Yutong buses, Huawei mobile phones, and many other brands continue to expand their markets in many countries.

The more important thing that must be addressed in the Trump-Xi summit is the avoidance of more political and military conflict in the region, from the Middle East to the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and the Taiwan independence issue.

THE ASEAN
Last Friday, May 8, the ASEAN summit was successfully held in Cebu as the leaders of the member-countries reiterated that they would be 鈥渞einforcing peace and security through dialogue and cooperation, promoting maritime cooperation as an important avenue for enhancing regional connectivity, mutual trust and dialogue, deepening economic integration鈥� peaceful settlement of disputes, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force in accordance with international law鈥︹��

Using the same indicators as Table 1, I summarized the numbers for the ASEAN-6 plus South Korea, Taiwan ,and Australia. Notable was the fast expansion in GDP size of other Asian economies in just two decades, from 2005 to 2025.

In merchandise trade, Singapore has more exports than the UK, Russia, and Canada. In power generation, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Vietnam are larger than the UK (see Table 2).

The real driver of the global economy now is Asia, not North America or Europe. The pace of industrialization, manufacturing expansion, and modernization, and electricity production to power those big and expanding industrial needs, are simply fast, led by China, India, South Korea, and Japan.

In the ASEAN, the leading economies are Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam. The Philippines has generally been left behind by some of its ASEAN neighbors in many aspects of industrialization, but this is not necessarily bad for us. Our merchandise trade deficit can be compensated for by non-merchandise trade surplus. It is important that free trade should prevail, and that discriminatory non-tariff barriers be kept to the minimum.

More importantly, we need to look inwards more and address various governance problems and issues that adversely affect our businesses, industries, and exporters.

Bienvenido S. Oplas, Jr. is the president of Bienvenido S. Oplas, Jr. Research Consultancy Services, and Minimal Government Thinkers. He is an international fellow of the Tholos Foundation.

minimalgovernment@gmail.com

With foreign guests visit, especially relatives who live abroad, there is the tendency to go beyond simply making them feel welcome. There is the need to overwhelm them with experiences. This behavior is more pronounced when the hosts themselves have been welcomed abroad by these visitors. The effort to reciprocate is almost obligatory.

With the regularity of a nurse checking the blood pressure of a patient in intensive care, we ask the guest we are treating out that question which is supposed to reflect how we are rated as a host 鈥� 鈥淎re you enjoying?鈥� This query is repeated between courses in a restaurant or at every stop on an out-of-town trip. Filipino English causes the transitive verb (to enjoy) which requires a direct object to dangle intransitively. Enjoyment, after all, needs to have an object of desire. (Are you enjoying the oysters?)

Intransitive verbs, like 鈥渟wim鈥� or 鈥渟leep鈥� do not need to have an object. One can correctly ask her guest 鈥� are you sleeping?

Still, this dangling transitive verb conveys what a Filipino host is truly concerned with 鈥� not a particular experience, but the guest鈥檚 state of mind. The question is asked repeatedly to check if the feeling of utter delight is sustained. Hesitation, on the part of the guest who has answered this question enthusiastically in the last 20 minutes, is viewed as a sign of the host鈥檚 inadequacy. (Or maybe it鈥檚 jet lag?)

The menu of activities to offer depends on how long the guests are staying, the number of hosts (other close relatives) offering to attend to them, and the interests of these visitors. Do they like karaoke, binge eating of lechon, beaches with white sand, a less hectic schedule with plenty of rest in between outings like malling?

The question of enjoyment comes fast and furious during mealtimes, at least five in one day. (You should try this chicharon. It has clingy fat attached to the skin.) As the guest is masticating a meal of chewy pork innards cooked in its own blood, all eyes are turned on him for facial clues. (Was that a grin or a smirk?)

The thoughtful guest needs a collection of superlatives at hand to respond to the host鈥檚 repeated question on the state of enjoyment. It is not enough to give a simple nod to a question which requires imagination and a bit of poetry.

Here are some acceptable responses:

This is the best beach resort I鈥檝e ever been to. It beats Honolulu.

Is this what they mean when they say 鈥渏ackpot鈥�? (Okay, that needs some work.)

Are you sure your house has not been featured in Architectural Digest? Look at how your indoor garden highlights the homey ambience of the place. And that mosaic-tiled pool looks so inviting.

Pinch me to prove this is not a dream.

For food only, and not to be used when being introduced to a person, sound effects can be employed鈥� mmmmmm, ngawwww, oh鈥� mama, mama, mama. These verbal punctuations can be accompanied by body shivering and fluttery eyelids, maybe a tongue sticking out. (So, you liked the bangus belly?)

It is a social offense in this part of the world to show annoyance with the question, 鈥淎re you enjoying?鈥� Or the variant, 鈥淒id you enjoy?鈥� Not to be used as responses are the following: Hey, you asked me that already鈥� Can鈥檛 you see I鈥檓 trying to eat here鈥� Yes, yes, yes, are you happy now鈥� Uh, it鈥檚 okay.

When the question no longer comes up, it is an unmistakable sign that a guest has overstayed his welcome and is starting to irritate the hosts. Hospitality turns first to annoyance and then contempt, and finally into mild revulsion. Behind the guest鈥檚 back, the hosts then exchange nasty snipes at the expense of the unwary guest who is ironically happy to be finally left alone. The host wonders, sometimes aloud, 鈥淲hen is he leaving?鈥�

At this point, the guest may finally be looking forward to going home鈥� and finally enjoying himself.

Tony Samson is chairman and CEO of TOUCH xda.

ar.samson@yahoo.com

The Philippine seafaring industry is currently facing an inconvenient truth: its market share in the global market is shrinking. Between 2000 and 2025, there has been a 1.74% decrease in the overall number of Filipino seafarer supply, with the absolute number of seafarers plateauing at 218,000 to 226,000 readily available seafarers each year. Even more worrying is the 24.65% fall (-1.13% compound annual growth rate) in the Philippines overall market share versus the global supply within the same period.

Part of the decline may be attributed to increased global competition and challenges related to the perceived negative reputation of Filipino seafarers, which can harm their prospects for future recruitment.

Some studies noted that Filipino seafarers are notorious for abusing personal disability compensation lawsuits against companies, which disincentivize future hirings. Some individuals, including Filipino lawyers, are also said to take advantage of the ambulance-chasing scheme enabled by the existing mechanisms for labor dispute resolution overseen by the Department of Labor and Employment (DoLE) through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) and the National Labor Relations (NLRC). Major employers across the globe have raised concerns about this with the International Maritime Employers Council.

On the other hand, concerns also arise with respect to the quality of seafarers being produced by the training institutes.

In 2022, 50,000 Filipino workers on European ships faced the threat of losing their jobs as the Philippines鈥� training standards fell short of the European Maritime Safety Agency鈥檚 (EMSA) evaluations. This has been a longstanding issue, with the Philippines being accused of neglecting compliance for the past 16 years since 2006 鈥� a damaging blow considering its reputation as the world鈥檚 largest supplier of seafarers. Fortunately, the crisis has since been averted with the European Commission鈥檚 decision in March 2023 to recognize certifications issued by Marina, as the Maritime Industry Authority is known. However, this effectively only buys time for the country to correct what the regulators call 鈥渁 hopefully temporary fall in standards.鈥�

COMPETITION
The Philippines will have to increasingly contend with the other major suppliers of seafarers.

The Philippine market share may have been eroded by the consistent growth of the numbers of seafarers from China, India, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Chinese seafarers are considered an alternative to their Filipino counterparts and may expand their presence in the international labor market if seafaring becomes a more attractive career path.

However, as mentioned in part one of this series, according to the Association of Licensed Manning Agencies (ALMA), Chinese seafarers are increasingly being deployed to primarily address their own internal needs, considering that China is the world鈥檚 top maritime-based trading economy. Consequently, it is probable that any count in Chinese seafarers within the global market share will be offset by a corresponding count of Chinese-flagged vessels. Meanwhile, India has emerged as the Philippines鈥� main competitor in supplying seafarers to the global market.

Other populous nations, such as Indonesia and those in Africa, are slowly emerging as growing suppliers of seafarers. One way the Philippines can stay ahead is to increase the number of schools that train officers for international vessels.

OFFICERS
One very productive way the Philippines can benefit from its demographic dividend (its average age is the youngest in Asia at 26 years) is to produce more seafaring officers.

The country has a large number of maritime academies, colleges, and training centers that prepare seafaring officers (deck officers and marine engineers). These fall into two main groups: Degree-granting schools (BS Marine Transportation/ BS Marine Engineering); and Postgraduate and Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers or STCW training centers (for certification and upgrading). Among the best known institutions producing ship officers are the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA, in Zambales) and the Maritime Academy of Asia and the Pacific (in Bataan). The former is government-sponsored and is a quasi-military academy and produces officers for the merchant marine, Navy, and Coast Guard. The latter is industry-backed (by the Associated Marine Officers鈥� and Seamen鈥檚 Union of the Philippines or AMOSUP) and has world-class facilities. It offers programs leading to degrees in BS Marine Transportation and Marine Engineering.

Reflecting the major role of the private sector in post-secondary education, there are a good number of leading private maritime colleges. Among them are the John B. Lacson Foundation Maritime University with campuses in Iloilo and Bacolod; the University of Cebu Maritime Education and Training Center; the Asian Institute of Maritime Studies in Metro Manila; the Mapua-PTC College of Maritime Education and Training in Laguna; and, the Palompon Institute of Technology in Leyte. Other recognized maritime schools are the University of Perpetual Help System DALTA Maritime; the Philippine Maritime Institute, the Southwestern University Maritime Regiment, the Davao Merchant Marine Academy, and the Holy Cross of Davao College Maritime.

With the current emphasis in human resource development on constant upskilling, reskilling, and retooling of professionals and workers, Maritime Training Institutes are playing a greater role in STCW. After graduation from their respective schools, officers are required to take mandatory STCW courses and upgrading programs. Some of the major training centers for this purpose are the AMOSUP Seamen鈥檚 Training Center, the Philippine Transmarine Carriers Training Center, NYK-TDG Maritime Academy (well known for producing high-quality ship officers especially for Japanese liners); the Magsaysay Training Center, and Marlow Navigation Philippines Training Center. These training institutions provide basic safety training, advanced courses (e.g., tankers, ECDIS, bridge/engine simulation), and officer upgrading (OIC, Chief Mate, Master, Chief Engineer).

With increased competition from other countries providing manpower for the international shipping industry, the Philippines must take full advantage of being considered as the preferred country for quality seafarers.

We must continue to build on our strengths such as English language proficiency, the supply of both ratings and officers, the relative appeal of seafaring as an occupation to many Filipino youths compared to shore-based employment, and retention of employees. These strengths may be eroded, however, if both the quality and quantity of Filipino seafarers deteriorate, particularly in light of recent failures to meet the STCW qualifications, the alleged exploitative labor practices, and a lack of strategic response to emerging international competition.

ADDRESSING CHALLENGES
To safeguard its competitive advantage in the global maritime labor market, the Philippines must urgently address these challenges and implement reforms that will sustain its long-term competitiveness.

A robust response is the Magna Carta of Filipino Seafarers (Republic Act 12021) which mandates maritime higher education institutions to align with Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and MARINA standards, enabling cadetship slots, access to simulators or training ships and quality onboard training.

Despite strong opposition from maritime schools, which are complaining about high compliance costs and potential enrolment caps, the law addresses European Maritime Safety Agency audit deficiencies to maintain STCW compliance and secure the Philippines鈥� position as a leading global seafarer supplier. Full implementation 鈥� supported by the law鈥檚 implementing rules and regulation 鈥� is critical to sustaining these reforms.

(To be continued.)

Bernardo M. Villegas has a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard, is professor emeritus at the University of Asia and the Pacific, and a visiting professor at the IESE Business School in Barcelona, Spain. He was a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

bernardo.villegas@uap.asia

During the ASEAN-EU Sustainability Summit 2026, Special Assistant to the President for Investment and Economic Affairs Secretary Frederick Go reaffirmed the Philippine government鈥檚 commitment to fiscal discipline, prudent spending, and maintaining macroeconomic stability amid global uncertainty. His remarks reflected how resilience today extends beyond environmental policy to include energy security, economic competitiveness, investment stability, and governments鈥� capacity to respond to external shocks.

Secretary Go also emphasized the administration鈥檚 calibrated response to geopolitical tensions and oil price volatility, including efforts to diversify energy sources, strengthen long-term energy security, and provide targeted support for vulnerable sectors while maintaining fiscal and monetary discipline. Amid persistent inflationary pressures and slowing growth globally, this sends an important signal of policy stability and investor confidence.

The latest disruption, brought about by the war in Iran and constraints in the Strait of Hormuz, has only magnified these vulnerabilities. Even if the Philippines is geographically distant from the conflict, its effects are immediately felt through higher oil prices and the rising cost of goods and services.

These pressures have already been reflected in economic indicators. Gross Domestic Product for the first quarter of the year grew by a sluggish 2.8%, while inflation rose to 7.2% in April from 4.1% in March.

Despite these headwinds, Mr. Go noted that the country鈥檚 macroeconomic fundamentals remain stable, supported by sustained growth, manageable inflation, a robust labor market, and prudent fiscal management.

Natural disasters continue to threaten whatever gains economies manage to build over time. Typhoons and flooding bring destruction to lives, livelihoods, and infrastructure, while also discouraging investments needed for jobs and long-term development.

It is therefore imperative that countries find ways to shield themselves from external shocks and secure a resilient and sustainable future.

As this year鈥檚 chair of the ASEAN, the Philippines is in a strong position to lead by example in balancing economic growth, investment competitiveness, and long-term resilience. The administration鈥檚 continued push for policy reforms and strategic investments, as aptly articulated by Mr. Go, reflects an understanding that resilience today must be both economic and environmental.

Under President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.鈥檚 administration, policies such as Executive Order No. 18, or the 鈥淕reen Lanes for Strategic Investments,鈥� have helped strengthen the country鈥檚 investment environment for renewable energy and energy security.

These reforms complement broader efforts to improve the ease and predictability of doing business in the Philippines. Mr. Go likewise highlighted the government鈥檚 push to deepen economic partnerships and attract investments in renewable energy, semiconductor manufacturing, digital infrastructure, smart agro-industries, electric vehicle components, and critical minerals processing.

The Philippines鈥� strategic advantages also position it well within the evolving regional economy. A young workforce, strong English proficiency, and an expanding consumer market support industries driven by digital adoption and technological innovation. The country鈥檚 reserves of nickel, copper, gold, and chromite also place it in an important position within the emerging green metals and energy transition value chain.

Climate resilience and energy security can no longer be treated as separate policy conversations. They are deeply interconnected challenges requiring coordinated, systems-based solutions across governments and industries.

During the fireside chat, Climate Change Commission Secretary Robert Borje emphasized that despite the temptation to revert to cheaper traditional energy sources during periods of volatility, 鈥渢here should be no other way to go but to work towards a green future.鈥�

His point is particularly important for ASEAN economies navigating both energy insecurity and climate vulnerability. In the long run, resilience cannot be built through short-term fixes alone. It requires sustained investments in renewable energy, climate adaptation, and resilient infrastructure.

For his part, Ambassador of the European Union Delegation to the Philippines Massimo Santoro highlighted two critical gaps in the ASEAN setting: the need to connect high-level ambition with financing, and the challenge of equipping local governments with the tools needed to turn policy into concrete action.

A cornerstone of this effort is the ASEAN Power Grid, which Mr. Santoro described as a 鈥渇undamental project鈥� that the European Union remains keen to support in reducing the systemic impact of energy shocks.

The discussions also underscored the importance of science-based and data-driven policymaking. Technologies such as satellite monitoring, climate analytics, and integrated data systems can significantly improve disaster preparedness and climate adaptation strategies across the region.

At the same time, sustainability cannot be achieved through state-to-state agreements alone. Mr. Santoro described the private sector as the 鈥渙nly one able to guarantee the sustainability鈥� of climate action. Beyond capital, the private sector contributes technical expertise in resilient infrastructure and disaster risk reduction.

The two regional blocs possess strengths that complement one another in responding to today鈥檚 challenges. ASEAN-EU-Philippines cooperation is particularly valuable because it combines financing, technology, expertise, and institutional partnerships that can scale resilience efforts beyond pilot projects into long-term regional solutions.

The ASEAN must move beyond being viewed merely as a production base or consumer market. The region has the opportunity to become a global hub for resilience, sustainable investments, and climate innovation.

Ultimately, resilience must remain people-centered. Climate and energy resilience are not only about protecting economies or infrastructure. They are about safeguarding livelihoods, ensuring energy and food security, creating sustainable jobs, and improving quality of life across the Philippines and the broader ASEAN region.

Victor Andres 鈥淒indo鈥� C. Manhit is the president of the Stratbase ADR Institute.

There is now broad recognition across the ASEAN that artificial intelligence will reshape industries, labor markets, education, governance, and even geopolitical influence over the next decade. At the same time, there is also a growing realization that no ASEAN country can fully maximize AI on its own. The opportunity is too large, the competition too intense, and the technological shifts too fast for fragmented approaches to succeed over the long term.

One of the most important topics discussed during the meetings was the Digital Economy Framework Agreement, more commonly known as DEFA. While it may still sound highly technical to many outside government and technology circles, DEFA could eventually become one of the most significant economic initiatives in the ASEAN鈥檚 modern history. It is the first regional digital economy framework agreement of its kind in the world, and it reflects the ASEAN鈥檚 attempt to move from broad digital ambitions toward a more coordinated regional strategy.

This matters because digital opportunities are often discussed in very general terms. Every country wants to become a digital hub. Every economy wants more startups, more innovation, and greater participation in digital trade. However, ambition without coordination often creates fragmentation. Countries end up building different standards, different regulations, and disconnected digital ecosystems that slow down growth instead of accelerating it. Rather than creating one strong regional digital economy, ASEAN risks creating 10 separate systems that struggle to work together.

The significance of DEFA lies in its effort to create alignment. Instead of each country pursuing entirely separate digital directions, the framework encourages the ASEAN to identify common priorities and shared opportunities. In the context of artificial intelligence, this becomes even more important because AI thrives on scale. It depends on large markets, large datasets, broad adoption, and deep talent pools. No single ASEAN country, not even the region鈥檚 largest economies, can individually match the scale of the United States or China. But collectively, the ASEAN represents more than 680 million people, one of the youngest populations globally, and one of the fastest growing digital economies in the world.

The region鈥檚 real strength therefore lies not in acting separately, but in acting together.

One of the more meaningful discussions during the ASEAN-BAC meetings centered around agriculture. Across Southeast Asia, millions of livelihoods still depend on farming and food production, yet many agricultural sectors continue to struggle with low productivity, climate risks, inefficient supply chains, and inconsistent market access. Artificial intelligence has the potential to significantly improve these conditions. Predictive analytics can help farmers improve crop planning, AI-driven weather forecasting can help communities prepare for climate disruptions, and smart systems can optimize irrigation, fertilizer use, and logistics management.

However, the challenges facing agriculture are increasingly regional rather than purely national. Climate disruptions do not stop at borders. Supply chain interruptions affect neighboring economies simultaneously. Food security itself is becoming an ASEAN concern, not just a domestic one. Sharing data, research, and AI-driven agricultural models across the ASEAN would create far greater impact than isolated national initiatives operating independently of one another.

The same point applies to micro, small and medium enterprises or MSMEs, which remain the backbone of the ASEAN economies, including the Philippines. Many MSMEs still struggle with digital adoption, access to financing, productivity tools, and regional market access. Artificial intelligence can help level the playing field by allowing smaller businesses to automate operations, improve customer engagement, forecast demand, and participate more effectively in digital commerce. Yet these benefits can only scale meaningfully if the ASEAN creates interoperable systems and aligned digital frameworks. If every country develops entirely different digital standards and compliance systems, smaller businesses will face even greater barriers when attempting to expand regionally.

This is why regional cooperation can no longer be viewed as optional.

The ASEAN has traditionally operated through consensus-building, and understandably so. Aligning 10 economies with different political systems, development levels, and national priorities is never easy. However, the pace of AI development globally means the ASEAN cannot afford to move too slowly. The uncomfortable reality is that artificial intelligence may become the defining economic divide of this generation. Countries and regions that adopt AI effectively will improve productivity, attract investments, strengthen competitiveness, and create higher-value industries. Those that hesitate risk becoming dependent on technologies, platforms, and systems developed elsewhere.

This shift is already happening globally. The United States and China continue investing heavily in AI infrastructure, semiconductor ecosystems, and talent development. Europe is accelerating efforts in AI governance and regulation. India is rapidly building digital public infrastructure integrating identity systems, payments, and data platforms at national scale. Against this backdrop, the ASEAN faces an important choice. The region can either move together with strategic clarity or continue operating in silos while the rest of the world advances at far greater speed.

I believe the private sector has a critical role to play in helping move this conversation forward. Governments will shape policies, but businesses will drive adoption. Industry groups, the academe, technology leaders, and enterprises across the ASEAN must work together to ensure that the region鈥檚 digital future becomes collaborative rather than fragmented. The Philippines itself is well positioned to contribute meaningfully to this effort because of our strengths in digital services, analytics, creativity, and human capital. However, we must think beyond national competitiveness alone. The larger opportunity lies in helping the ASEAN succeed collectively.

If the ASEAN works together on AI and digital transformation, the region can emerge as one of the world鈥檚 most dynamic and competitive economic blocs. If we continue approaching artificial intelligence country by country, we risk being left behind together.

The discussions during the ASEAN-BAC meetings reminded me that the opportunity before us is enormous, but so is the urgency. Artificial intelligence will reshape industries, economies, governance, and labor markets far faster than many organizations are prepared for. The question is whether the ASEAN will shape that future collectively or merely react to it individually.

This may very well be the ASEAN鈥檚 defining AI moment, and history rarely waits for regions that move too cautiously.

Dr. Donald Patrick Lim is the founding president of the Global AI Council Philippines and the Blockchain Council of the Philippines, and the founding chair of the Cybersecurity Council, whose mission is to advocate the right use of emerging technologies to propel business organizations forward. He is currently the president and COO of DITO CME Holdings Corp.

As AI tools become more sophisticated, individuals have been turning to intellectual property law to protect themselves and their likeness.

In the United States, Taylor Swift recently applied before the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for the registration of a mark which consists of a photograph of her 鈥渉olding a pink guitar, with a black strap and wearing a multi-colored iridescent bodysuit with silver boots.鈥� She also sought to register two sensory marks which consist of the spoken words 鈥淗ey, it鈥檚 Taylor Swift鈥� and 鈥淗ey, it鈥檚 Taylor.鈥�¹

Previously, Matthew McConaughey successfully registered four sound marks and four motion marks with the USPTO. His sound marks include his iconic phrase 鈥淎lright Alright Alright鈥� and 鈥淛ust keep livin鈥�, right? I mean, what else are we gonna do.鈥� Meanwhile, his motion marks document his tilted head movements and expansive hand gestures. He also has a pending application for a signature image of himself posed against a wood background.²

While the US offers broad flexibility for such marks, the legal landscape in the Philippines operates under different constraints. There is currently no express law allowing the registration of the trademark of likeness, but protection is somehow afforded through a combination of existing IP, privacy, and civil laws.

The Philippine IP Code allows the registration of visual marks, including names, images, and motion marks³. Several local celebrities 鈥� including Sharon Cuneta, Noli De Castro, Pokwang, and Vice Ganda 鈥� have secured trademark registrations for their names which they use in the entertainment industry. The law also prohibits registering any mark which consists of a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.⁴ In cases involving confusion or deception, the unauthorized use of a person鈥檚 likeness may also amount to unfair competition.⁵ Additional protection is provided by the New Civil Code which prohibits the unauthorized use and usurpation of another鈥檚 name.⁶ Meanwhile, the Data Privacy Act penalizes the unauthorized use and processing of personal information, including names and images of persons.⁷

Despite these, Philippine law remains primarily limited to visual marks, and does not yet extend formal trademark protection to an individual鈥檚 voice. To protect this aspect of one鈥檚 identity, the enactment of a legislation amending the IP Code is required.

There are at least three bills⁸ filed with the Senate and the House of Representatives proposing to codify one鈥檚 right over his or her likeness and identity. These bills uniformly provide that every person shall have the exclusive right to control and monetize the commercial use of their identity, including their name, image, video, portrait, voice, likeness, signature, and other identifiable personal attributes, even without formal registration.

The bills also provide for remedies, such as the immediate removal or takedown of content, the recovery of compensation and damages, and the right to initiate civil proceedings.⁹ One bill even proposes to create an office in the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines for the registration of likeness trademarks.

Even in the absence of a direct statute, it is clear that an individual鈥檚 identity may be protected as one鈥檚 intellectual property. However, as technology evolves and becomes more sophisticated, legal frameworks must also adapt. More than preserving reputation or celebrity status, protecting one鈥檚 likeness has become about defending the commercial and personal integrity of the individual in an increasingly digital and AI-driven world.

(This article is for general informational and educational purposes only and not offered as, and does not constitute legal advice or legal opinion.)

¹ https://tinyurl.com/2b3zywms

² https://tinyurl.com/2a4unol3

https://tinyurl.com/2c3r799g

https://tinyurl.com/2dz2uj2v

https://tinyurl.com/25u7zos3

https://tinyurl.com/236ngfos

https://tinyurl.com/258lqamn

https://tinyurl.com/27zx4bdu

https://tinyurl.com/22nyhljx

https://tinyurl.com/29ston5t

https://tinyurl.com/2c8blcvk

https://tinyurl.com/29o2jkre

³ Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the 鈥淚ntellectual Property Code of the Philippines鈥�; IPOPHL Memorandum Circular No. 2023-001.

⁴ Section 123.1(c), IP Code.

⁵ Section 168, IP Code.

⁶ Articles 377, 378 379, 380, New Civil Code.

⁷ Republic Act No. 10173, otherwise known as the 鈥淒ata Privacy Act of 2012鈥�.

⁸ Senate Bill No. 758. An Act Recognizing Individual Rights Over One鈥檚 Likeness And Identity, Regulating The Creation And Use Of Deepfakes Through Disclosure, Consent, And Platform Accountability, Providing Remedies And Penalties Therefor, And For Other Purposes. (See https://senate.gov.ph/legacy/lis_bills/4729643295!.pdf) House Bill No. 3214. Establishing Protection Against Deepfakes, Recognizing the Right to One鈥檚 Face, Body and Voice, Providing Trademark Protection, and for Other Purposes. (See https://docs.congress.hrep.online/legisdocs/basic_20/HB03214.pdf) Senate Bill No. 1714. Safeguarding Individual Likeness, Identity, And Publicity Rights By Regulating The Creation And Use Of Deepfakes Through Disclosure, Consent, And Platform Accountability, And Providing Remedies And Penalties Therefor, And For Other Purposes. (See https://senate.gov.ph/legacy/lis_bills/4886444808!.pdf )

⁹ Senate Bill No. 758.

Atty. Clarisse Paulina M. Valdecantos is a senior associate of the Intellectual Property Department of Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRALAW).

cmvaldecantos@accralaw.com

+632-8830-8000

Recent research highlights a shift from targeted persuasion 鈥� communication aimed at convincing specific people 鈥� to information saturation and disruption, in which the goal is to overwhelm people with excessive information. The RAND Corp. calls this the 鈥渇irehose of falsehood,鈥� a model that uses high-volume, rapid messaging 鈥� often with inconsistent or conflicting statements 鈥� to flood audiences and make it hard to determine what is true.

For Boards and senior executives, the nature of the threat has shifted. The risk is no longer just a single false story but the erosion of a shared factual reality. This complicates crisis response and investor relations. These risks are real 鈥� they are documented globally and are especially relevant in the Philippines, one of the world鈥檚 most active social media environments. The challenge stems from information saturation and disruption, the 鈥�firehose of falsehood鈥� model: high-volume, rapid, and often contradictory messaging that overwhelms rather than persuades. For Boards, the primary threat is not a single false narrative, but the loss of a shared factual baseline. This makes both crisis response and stakeholder communication harder. This context frames the tactics behind modern disinformation.

THE THREE PILLARS OF DISRUPTION
Modern disinformation campaigns, whether driven by state or decentralized actors, typically pursue three main objectives:

鈥� Confusion: Flooding the information space with conflicting narratives reduces the public鈥檚 ability to distinguish fact from fiction.

鈥� Division: Messaging exploits social and political divisions, pitting stakeholders against each other.

鈥� Erosion of Trust: Ongoing exposure to manipulated content erodes public trust in institutions, including corporations.

WHY WE ARE 鈥楶ATIENT ZERO鈥�
Corporate leaders in the Philippines face heightened exposure. Researchers call the country 鈥減atient zero鈥� for large-scale social media manipulation. The Philippines has some of the world鈥檚 highest rates of social media use. It is also a 鈥渇ake news factory,鈥� where coordinated campaigns, influencer networks, and 鈥渢roll farms鈥� precisely shape public perception.

In this environment, brand reputation is not just about performance; it is a target of coordinated narrative attacks. We are now seeing the rise of several new tactics:

鈥� Synthetic Media (Deepfakes): AI now enables the creation of hyper-realistic fabricated content. This includes fake CEO statements or false evidence. Such content can be used to blackmail or undermine real corporate communications. Deepfakes also make it easier to create false evidence or to undermine real evidence (鈥渓iar鈥檚 dividend鈥�).

鈥� Memetic and Viral Content: Short, emotionally charged content spreads faster than factual information. Content that triggers anger or fear often bypasses analytical reasoning.

鈥� Narrative Framing: This technique presents factually correct information in a way that still deceives. By emphasizing some details and omitting others, communicators can mislead stakeholders.

鈥� 鈥淚nsider鈥� Leaks: Disinformation often appears as content claiming to be privileged or suppressed knowledge. These so-called 鈥渓eaks,鈥� which are unverified information from anonymous sources, can quickly gain traction during corporate crises.

These can gain traction quickly, especially when official information is limited. Emotionally charged content spreads more widely and influences judgment. Anger and fear reduce analytical processing, and high emotional arousal increases sharing behavior.

The Philippine environment presents unique amplifiers:

鈥� High Social Media Penetration: The country ranks among the highest globally in time spent on social media, increasing exposure to viral misinformation.

鈥� Influencer and Networked Campaigns: Political messaging, influencer marketing, and entertainment now blend, blurring the line between organic and coordinated content.

鈥� Trust Dynamics: Public trust in institutions can shift quickly, making narratives 鈥� positive or negative 鈥� more volatile. According to the World Economic Forum, misinformation and disinformation erode trust and exacerbate societal divides.

QUANTIFYING THE ENTERPRISE RISK
This is not merely a social problem. It is a systemic enterprise risk with tangible impacts:

鈥� Financial and Market Risk: Disinformation can trigger sudden market swings that can affect stock prices and erode partner confidence.

鈥� Operational and Internal Risk: External narratives can trigger internal polarization. This can fracture workforce cohesion and hinder decision-making.

鈥� Regulatory Risk: Governments are watching as the EU and UK increase scrutiny of how companies manage their roles in the information ecosystem. Various countries have implemented some form of 鈥渢ruth in content.鈥� Failing to address these risks can result in significant political and regulatory exposure.

A DELIBERATE RESPONSE FOR THE BOARDROOM
Given the speed and scale of these threats, Boards must act decisively. Move beyond reactive measures: establish a dedicated information risk committee at the Board or executive level. Implement regular scenario planning and tabletop simulations to strengthen readiness and crisis response. Require periodic briefings on emerging manipulation tactics and annual reviews of information risk management policies to ensure alignment with evolving threats. Take these concrete steps now to embed a strategic mandate in practical governance.

鈥� Integrate information risk into Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). Disinformation is false or misleading information spread to deceive. It should be recognized as a formal category within enterprise risk governance, not merely a public relations issue. Boards can formalize this by including information risk in the enterprise risk register. Establish clear reporting lines for relevant risk committees or the Board. Ensure that regular risk reports specifically address information threats. Assign Board-level or executive oversight of information risk to ensure accountability and integration across business functions.

鈥� Invest in Narrative Tracking. Boards should use social listening tools to detect coordinated activity and emerging narratives early. When selecting tools, Boards should consider several criteria, including the ability to scale enterprise needs, comprehensive coverage of relevant platforms, support for local languages, advanced alerting, and compliance with data privacy requirements. Tools with intuitive dashboards and customizable reporting also enhance Board-level oversight. Assess vendors on these points to catch issues before they reach a tipping point.

鈥� Build Resilience through Literacy. Leaders and employees should receive media literacy training to help them recognize misinformation, including synthetic media, misleading narratives, and manipulative content. Key goals include critically evaluating digital content, understanding viral dynamics, identifying sources, verifying claims, and practicing accurate messaging during incidents. A 2025 study identified effective and ineffective corrections, provided practical insights for social media platforms, and suggested designs for more effective interventions.

EXPANDING THREAT LANDSCAPE: BEYOND STATE ACTORS
While state-sponsored campaigns often attract attention, similar tactics are also used by political actors, activist groups, competitors, and opportunistic bad actors. Social media manipulation by political actors is now an industrial-scale problem, prevalent in over 80 countries. We must recognize that information risk is persistent and multidirectional, not limited to geopolitical conflict.

KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR DIRECTORS
鈥� Information risk is now a core strategic risk, not merely a communications issue.

鈥� Modern propaganda often aims to confuse and divide, not merely persuade.

鈥� The Philippines presents a high-exposure environment because of high digital literacy and consumption levels.

鈥� Emotional and viral dynamics can quickly escalate reputational crises.

鈥� Proactive governance and preparedness are essential for mitigating the impact.

The contemporary information environment moves quickly and operates on a vast scale. Disinformation campaigns, whether state-driven or decentralized, exploit this speed and complexity to influence perception, behavior, and trust.

CALL TO ACT
Today鈥檚 information environment is complex and contested. Managing disinformation cannot be confined to corporate communications. Information risk is now a core strategic threat that can destabilize stock prices, polarize workforces, and erode customer trust.

Boards must ensure that information integrity is a core part of enterprise risk management. Institutional strength in the 鈥減ost-truth鈥� era depends on leadership. Leaders must understand both the company鈥檚 messaging and how the broader information environment is manipulated. Boards need to build institutional resilience. This is not just about responding to incidents but about protecting information integrity in a contested landscape. To support effective governance and clear accountability, oversight of information risk should be formally assigned to the Board. Ideally, this responsibility would be given to the Risk Committee, or, if not already established, to a dedicated Information Risk Committee or to a designated Board officer, such as the Chief Risk Officer, who would ensure that strategies and controls are in place and regularly reviewed. This explicit assignment clarifies ownership and supports strong follow-through on mitigation and preparedness.

A disciplined, research-informed approach, paired with local market awareness, will be critical to navigating this evolving risk landscape.

Gil B. Genio is governor and secretary of the Management Association of the Philippines or MAP. He is a retired banker and Globe and Ayala executive, and a member of the Analytics and AI Association of the Philippines and the Institute of Corporate Directors. He is an independent director at GT Capital Holdings, the Puregold Price Club, and Megawide Construction.

map@map.org.ph

iamgilgenio@gmail.com