Could Senator Leila de Lima be right? Was President Rodrigo Duterte鈥檚 speech as 鈥減lastic and (as) fake as the dolomite beach鈥? Did he not really mean what he said?
Senator De Lima was primarily alluding to Mr. Duterte鈥檚 pre-recorded speech before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which she compared to the P389.8-million 鈥渨hite sand鈥 folly the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) had made out of portions of Manila Bay.
A Duterte critic who has been detained in the headquarters of the Philippine National Police (PNP) since 2017 on drug charges she claims to be politically motivated, the senator was outraged by Mr. Duterte鈥檚 saying in that speech that the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) denying China鈥檚 claims on the West Philippine Sea and recognizing Philippine rights to it is binding, already part of international law, and can no longer be challenged. His declaration, she pointed out, is totally at odds with what she called his four years of 鈥渂etraying鈥 that ruling 鈥渢o curry favor鈥 with China.
Mr. Duterte had indeed said in his previous speeches and other statements the exact opposite of what he affirmed in his UN speech. He has argued that the Philippines can do nothing about China鈥檚 occupation and militarization of the South China Sea, and declared a number of times that he would not contest it because doing so could provoke a war the Philippines would surely lose.
Among the consequences of that seeming policy have been the hitherto unchallenged intrusions of Chinese military sea craft in the Philippines鈥 Exclusive Economic Zone, and their driving Filipino fisherfolk away from their traditional fishing grounds. Some 75% of the population have demanded that he do something to stop the behemoth鈥檚 assaults on Philippine sovereign rights.
Senator De Lima can鈥檛 be blamed for being skeptical of that portion of Mr. Duterte鈥檚 speech, the entirety of which, she said, sounded as if he was just delivering it as ghost written for him. She was in effect saying that Mr. Duterte鈥檚 ghost writer was just putting words in his mouth and making him say what he thought the UNGA and the international community wanted to hear.
It鈥檚 tempting to agree with that view because Mr. Duterte has often said things he later repudiated. He has many times contradicted himself, and even denied that he said what鈥檚 already on video, audio recordings, and other means of verification. But what challenges Senator De Lima鈥檚 allegation is an apparent shift in regime foreign policy that has been discernible over the past few months in the statements of Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teodoro Locsin, Jr.
On July 3 this year, Locsin 鈥 incidentally the most likely candidate for ghost writer of Mr. Duterte鈥檚 UNGA speech 鈥 warned China of 鈥渟evere responses,鈥 diplomatic or otherwise, should there be any 鈥渟pill over鈥 into Philippine territory of Chinese vessels engaged in military exercises in those parts of the South China Sea that are not the Philippines鈥 own.
The same Locsin 鈥 who has ghost written for at least two other Philippine Presidents 鈥 said in August that China should 鈥渆xpect the worst鈥 if the missiles fired by its warships during its military exercises enter the Philippines鈥 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). At about the same time, he also said he would invoke the PH-US 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and ask for United States assistance if China attacks a Philippine vessel in the West Philippine Sea.
And only 10 days ago, Locsin told the House of Representatives during hearings on the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 2021 budget that the Philippines does not agree with China鈥檚 demand that Western powers such as the United States be kept out of the West Philippine Sea. He made that statement in the context of the US鈥 increasingly confrontational military presence in the area that China has denounced as a 鈥減rovocation.鈥 Locsin said US presence in the area is necessary 鈥渁s a balancer,鈥 because 鈥渢he freedom of the Filipino people depends on the balance of power in the South China Sea.鈥
Equally relevant as a sign of this shift was Mr. Duterte鈥檚 Sept. 7 absolute pardon of the US Marine Corps鈥 Lance Corporal Joseph Scott Pemberton. That decision indicated a departure from Mr. Duterte鈥檚 seemingly pro-China course by assuring the US that it can still get what it wants, in exchange for whatever benefits the regime can get from it. Locsin denied that the trade-off involved in the pardon is the Philippines鈥 being a priority recipient of a US anti-COVID-19 vaccine, and he may be right: what the regime he serves is likely to gain from it will most probably be more than that.
All the above suggest that Mr. Duterte鈥檚 affirmation of the 2016 PCA ruling is unlikely to be mere words, or a gesture without meaning. It must be viewed in the context of the shift in his foreign policy, this time away from China, whose occupation and militarization of the West Philippine Sea is completely unacceptable to the United States. The US policy of 鈥渇ull spectrum dominance鈥 over land, sea, air and space and of 鈥渃ontaining鈥 China to prevent its rise as another superpower has never wavered whatever party is in power, whether Democrat or Republican, and remains in place today.
Surprised by Mr. Duterte鈥檚 declaration of support for the 2016 PCA decision, some may not have believed it, but others may also be wondering what drove him to it. Was it his realization that the US is far, far superior to China militarily, and that the outcome of any confrontation between them is hardly debatable? Was it in anticipation of increased military and economic aid, and continuing US support for his regime despite its despotism and flagrant human rights violations? Was it due to pressure from the pro-US military establishment whose generals have been bridling at Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea?
It could be all the above. But that would not preclude the possibility that Mr. Duterte鈥檚 claims to implementing an 鈥渋ndependent foreign policy鈥 that would 鈥渟eparate鈥 the Philippines from the US and instead bring it closer to Russia and China were from the very beginning calculated to alarm the US enough for it to shower the regime with the military, economic, and political support it needs to keep it firmly in power until, or even beyond, 2022.
If that is indeed the case, it would make Mr. Duterte as shrewd and as cunning as his mentor and idol Ferdinand Marcos. During his 14-year dictatorship from 1972 to 1986, that tyrant played the United States against the now defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the then socialist People鈥檚 Republic of China (PRC) to gain political advantage and provoke the three into competing for the regime鈥檚 favor in terms of who could best provide it military and economic aid.
Despite his declaration of support for the PCA ruling, which has earned him the praise of his critics, the possibility is that as in 2016 when he managed to win the Presidency by pretending not to be interested in it, Mr. Duterte has once again outwitted analysts, his critics and even his allies. The cruel irony is that as assertive of Philippine sovereignty as his affirmation of Philippine rights over its territorial waters is, it is also another sign that the US will continue aiding and abetting tyrannical rule and tightening its grip on these sorry isles.
Luis V. Teodoro is on Facebook and Twitter (@luisteodoro).
