Sam Bankman-Fried won鈥檛 be the last crypto mogul behind bars

JUSTICE has been served 鈥 and swiftly, too. A jury found fallen crypto mogul Sam Bankman-Fried of fraud and conspiracy after just five hours of deliberation, markedly less time than it took for jurors to puzzle over Elizabeth Holmes鈥 Theranos scandal or Raj Rajaratnam鈥檚 insider trading at hedge fund Galleon. And while this is certainly crypto鈥檚 biggest case of fraud, it undoubtedly won鈥檛 be the last.
If the 31-year-old鈥檚 culpability for the 鈥溾 behind FTX鈥檚 collapse seemed so obvious, it鈥檚 partly because he was prosecutorial gold. You didn鈥檛 have to know what a blockchain was to comprehend his former lieutenants saying that the $8 billion of missing customer funds happened on his watch and with his knowledge. Nor did you have to grasp GAAP accounting to see that the frizzy-haired wunderkind鈥檚 own testimony contradicted his communications and electronic records. Bankman-Fried had no filter, though his lawyers he had.
Having lost a lot of people a ton of money, Bankman-Fried鈥檚 lack of empathy and remorse played a big role in this trial. And that matters when committing corporate crimes: If you don鈥檛 care about other people, especially your customers, it becomes very easy to exploit them. Or, as Dan Davies on social media, to take a $10 billion account labeled 鈥淣ot My Money鈥 and re-label it 鈥淢y Money.鈥 There was a dangerous mindlessness to Bankman-Fried, once worth more than $15 billion, who openly played video games while giving interviews or holding meetings.
Bankman-Fried鈥檚 fate looks sealed, with lengthy jail time likely to be ordered when he鈥檚 sentenced in March, but I don鈥檛 believe for a second that this will be the last crypto fraud. We鈥檝e closed one chapter of COVID-era laser-eyed true believers, yet market prices are stirring once more as TradFi firms see an opening to offer Bitcoin and other products with the potential blessing of regulators. FOMO remains strong. 鈥淥ne camp of people in my group is saying forget it, the value of crypto is zero, there鈥檚 nothing behind it,鈥 Bjoern Jesch, the global chief investment officer of $900-billion German asset manager DWS Group, said in an interview with Bloomberg News. 鈥淎nd there鈥檚 this other group of people saying like, hmm, I mean at least there鈥檚 a price of $35,000 for Bitcoin. Someone is paying $35,000.鈥
There are other parts to the story of FTX that explain the incentives beyond the individual. The crypto sub-culture, for example, and its overlap with the aggressive quantitative trading culture where Bankman-Fried cut his teeth. Few in crypto-land seemed to blink an eye at the huge amounts of leverage offered by FTX, its lack of a chief financial officer or paucity of experience among its senior managers. The exchange鈥檚 raciest growth happened offshore while US regulators focused their attention on TradFi (where everything from public-transit tickets to expenses are scrutinized these days). FTX, along with other market players, even invented its own token, FTT, and used it as cash 鈥 Bankman-Fried鈥檚 view that 鈥渕oney is fungible anyway鈥 is pure crypto babble, but plenty of people bought into it until the inevitable painful contact with reality.
You only have to read Going Infinite by Michael Lewis to see the cultural overlaps with his earlier book about 1980s Wall Street, Liar鈥檚 Poker. While at Jane Street, Bankman-Fried and those he would later hire took full advantage of a culture that encouraged teachable gambling between employees and interns 鈥 with a loss limit of $100 per day per intern 鈥 and put a rocket under it at Alameda Research and FTX, exploiting market inefficiencies but also settling scores. It may have been this score-settling that saw Bankman-Fried double down on misusing customer funds, for example when buying out rival platform Binance鈥檚 stake in FTX.
And then there鈥檚 the outer circle of willing enablers. What would Bankman-Fried have been without the long line of venture capitalists throwing more than $27 billion into crypto during 2021鈥檚 pandemic-fueled euphoria, clearly without serious due diligence? Or the institutional investors parking their funds at a trading venue in the Bahamas? Or the accounting firm based in the metaverse appointed to audit FTX? It鈥檚 easy to talk about 鈥渕issed鈥 red flags, but there was willful blindness here. In late 2021, , and in 2022 of the . When I asked one of my investing sources why, despite his own misgivings, he continued to use FTX, his answer was: 鈥淏ecause we can鈥檛 afford not to.鈥
There may be deeper reasons why the risk of fraud remains. In his 1993 book Out of Control, Zbigniew Brzezinski warned that a kind of self-indulgent and permissive attitude to capitalism would break people鈥檚 moral compass and simply outsource morality to the courts. He called it 鈥減rocedural morality鈥 鈥 essentially, see what you can get away with until the law says 鈥渟top.鈥 As clear as last week鈥檚 trial verdict is, that kind of incentive remains. With every boom-and-bust cycle, standards get lax and exchanges collapse. My own first exposure to crypto was reporting on the 2014 collapse of Mt Gox, helmed by a young geek called Mark Karpeles; he of embezzlement charges, and SBF鈥檚 antics in hindsight make his look positively minor. Even if banks take over more of the industry, I鈥檓 not sure the crypto culture around tokens backed by thin air pitched as digital gold will improve.
My other hunch is that FTX鈥檚 investment in hotly valued artificial intelligence (AI) startup Anthropic, which may play a big role in making some creditors whole, might have symbolic resonance down the line. In the coming years, the next big corporate scandal may very well have 鈥淎I鈥 on its perpetrator鈥檚 resume. In the meantime, beware of gurus offering the future of money.
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